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Abstract
We show how elite capture affects optimal debt repatriations and management of
official reserves under capital controls, bridging literature on debt buybacks and sec-
ondary markets. The model we provide guides our study of one of history’s largest debt
repatriations -in 1930s Germany. Authorities kept private repatriations under strict
control -avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects- while allowing discretionary repa-
triations so to reap internal political benefits. German assets exhibited large spreads
between their domestic and foreign prices, granting arbitrage profits to those who had
forex access. New data reveals that spread dynamics were affected by the impact of
capital controls on secondary markets.
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The Protestant Ethic... ...and the Spirit of Capitalism.
[. . . ] the Schachtian policy of buying back
un-serviced loans below par contributed to
crushing Germany’s moral standing with
the creditors.
Hermann Abs, Head of the German
Delegation at the 1952 London Conference
on German External Debts1
He [Hermann Abs] bought back some of the
external German debt [. . . ] and made a
large arbitrage profit (the difference between
the very low price of German debt abroad,
and its face value price within Germany)
on the deal on his own account.2
1 Introduction
Capital controls are ubiquitous. According to the database of Fernández, Klein, Rebucci,
Schindler, and Uribe (2016), in 2017 only 8 countries out of the 100 analyzed had no capital
controls of sorts and just 32 countries could be classified as having generally unimpeded
(open) capital flows.3 When in place, controls on capital flows range from simple provisions
to avoid excessive risk-taking in some business sectors (e.g. pension funds and insurance) to
complete government control over all capital inflows and outflows. In general, capital controls
take the form of one or more of the following (partially overlapping) cases: a) a crisis tool e.g.
to stop bank runs and capital flight (e.g. Greece from 2015 to 2019) or prevent large capital
outflows that would endanger the stability of the exchange rate and debt sustainability (e.g.
Iceland from 2008 to 2017); b) a macroprudential policy tool, e.g. in the form of control
on inflows, aimed at achieving one or more of these policy objectives: reduce pressure on
the exchange rate4, alter the composition of flows, reduce their volume, and allow for a
more independent monetary policy5; c) a temporary tool (Klein, 2012; Reinhart and Smith,
2002), which can possibly evolve into a long-term policy, e.g. the exchange control systems
established in the U.K. and other European countries during World War II that stayed in
place well into the 1970s (Dooley, 1996); d) a defining and essential feature of an economic
system, as in the cases of contemporary China or India.
1Klug (1993, page 54), originally from Schwarz (1982, page 60). The introduction of the policy in question
actually precedes by a year Hjalmar Schacht’s return to the Reichsbank.
2James (2004, page 59). In the 1930s, when these transactions took place, Abs was a director at Deutsche
Bank. After World War II he would become a most important figure in German and world financial circles.
David Rockefeller dubbed him “the leading banker of the world” (West Germany: Two Sprecher for One,
Time magazine, June 16, 1967).
3According to the most recent version of their database (June 2019).
4New mercantilist policies of foreign reserve accumulation might complement this objective. For an overview
on the prudential vs mercantilist motive for reserve accumulation see Costinot, Lorenzoni, and Werning
(2014), Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2009), Ghosh, Ostry, and Tsangarides (2017), Pasricha (2020).
5See Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2018) for a literature review and further discussion on these policy
objectives.
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When a significant degree of capital controls is imposed, business conditions and eco-
nomic life at large tend to be severely affected by the laws, decrees, regulations, revisions,
exceptions, permission requests, delays, higher transaction costs, increased regulatory un-
certainty, etc. that characterize such systems. Against this backdrop of increased regulatory
hurdles, micromanagement, and government control, discretionary administrative decisions
acquire greater importance and elites close to the political power have the opportunity to
exploit the situation to their favour.6 On this point, James (2020) highlights the intrinsic
arbitrariness that follows the imposition of capital controls while Rajan and Zingales (1998)
suggest that capital controls are indeed a fundamental component of “relationship-based
capitalism”. The economic impact of elite capture can be significant: for example Hinner-
ich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014) show that differences of up to 60% in the provision of
public welfare in Sweden in the early 20th century were the result of distinct governance
systems differently vulnerable to elite capture. Moreover, relationship-based capitalism does
not foster the emergence of quality institutions, which in turn engenders increased sovereign
defaults and reduced capital flows (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and
Volosovych, 2007; Schularick and Steger, 2008; Bai and Wei, 2012).
Elite capture only scratches the surface of the social and political consequences of capital
controls. As an example, historically it has been relatively common for capital controls to
take the form of exchange controls (Ghosh and Qureshi, 2016), thus facilitating restrictions
on the current as well as on the capital account. Such considerations led Friedrich Hayek to
assert, with specific reference to the wide-ranging capital controls of the interwar period of
the 20th century, that “[t]he extent of the control over all life that economic control confers
is nowhere better illustrated than in the field of foreign exchanges.”7 Unsurprisingly, once
such control over economic life is established, it is difficult to relinquish it. This was the case
of Germany, for example, where “[t]he aim of exchange control [...] after the advent of the
National Socialists was the furtherance of their economic and political power both abroad
and at home”8: an exemplary and tragic transformation in the above classification from case
a) to c), and finally d).
With these considerations in mind, we address the question of how internal distribution
motives can interfere with the economic objectives of capital controls. We do this both
theoretically and by showing that the large debt repatriations carried out in Germany in the
1930s, one of the largest episodes of its kind, are explained by elite favouritism under capital
controls.
The model. Agents in our model have outstanding foreign-currency private debt with
foreign creditors. The domestic government imposes capital controls on all outflows in order
6Elite capture is documented in countries both with and without capital controls, economically developed
or developing. Two examples on opposite sides of the spectrum are Johnson and Mitton (2003) that find
that during the 1998 capital outflows controls in Malaysia, firms with political connections enjoyed larger
stock gains; Tahoun (2014) finds that members of the US congress own more stock of firms contributing
to their campaigns, and that these firms are then awarded more governmental contracts but only until the
member of congress finally divests in those firms before retirement.
7Hayek (1944, page 92).
8From Ellis (1940b), page 167. Italics added.
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to protect its foreign exchange reserves, thereby forcing (partial) default on its citizens by
(partially) blocking direct repayments to foreigners. In this situation, foreign creditors are
willing to sell their claims at less than face value and domestic debtors are willing to buy
them if they believe that this debt, once repatriated, will be enforced between domestic
agents (this assumption will be discussed below). When the repatriated debt is domesti-
cally serviced, in local currency, there exists a positive price of sale (in foreign currency)
such that the operation leads to arbitrage profits for domestic agents: strict capital controls
that greatly limit the availability of foreign currency for domestic agents will ensure this.
However, the arbitrage operation can only work if the domestic agent has access to foreign
currency, a resource strictly controlled by the government. The government allocates its
scarce foreign currency reserves between a public good, that requires imports and equally
benefits all citizens, and debt repatriations. Repatriations are only allowed for a group of
government supporters (the elite), who can therefore privately profit from the operation.
Higher repatriations, however, lead to two collective detrimental effects: first, lower pub-
lic spending that affects everyone’s welfare; second, more debt is serviced, as contracts of
repatriated debt will be enforced between domestic bondholders.
The model builds on the observation that, on one hand, stringent capital controls allow
for the emergence of different power structures within a country that we describe with
a non-utilitarian social welfare function representing elite capture. On the other hand,
the economic opportunities that the elite can potentially exploit due to capital controls
might run counter to the economic objective that led to their institution in the first place.
Indeed, we show that, when the social planner is utilitarian, no resources are ever devoted to
repatriations, thus reproducing the seminal result of Bulow and Rogoff (1991) (henceforth
BR) that the optimal level of debt repatriations9 is zero.10 A non-utilitarian social planner,
however, might assign positive amounts of foreign currency reserves for the elite to carry
out debt repatriations, depending on various structural characteristics of the economy and
the practical implementation of capital controls. Thus, in order to advantage the elite,
the government exploits opportunities from capital controls to conduct what amounts to a
transfer of resources from the non-elite to the elite, even if this advantages foreign creditors
by means of additional repayments (from the sale of the repatriated debt and its effects on
prices). In short, the government gains control over the relative size of the slices of the cake
(the internal distribution), at the cost of reducing the size of the cake (some resources are
transferred to foreigners).
9Throughout the paper we use the term repatriations rather than the related term buybacks, often used in
the macro and corporate finance literature. In a debt buyback it is the issuer of debt, private or public,
that repurchases its own debt. A debt repatriation occurs when a domestic agent buys a debt obligation
held by a foreign agent but issued by another domestic agent. It is thus a more general and appropriate
term than buyback for the phenomenon we study in this paper.
10Despite this, sovereign buybacks often resurface as policy options: apart from the South American debt
crisis of the 1980s, which triggered much attention and, inter alia, Bulow and Rogoff’s investigation, they
re-emerged in the European debt crisis of the 2010s (Buying Back Greek Debt Rewarded Hedge Funds, N.Y.
Times, December 24, 2012) and during the 2016 US Presidential election campaign (Donald Trump wants
to buy back Treasury bonds on the cheap, The Economist, May 6, 2016), for example.
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Our framework generalizes BR’s result over additional dimensions: it incorporates capital
controls and the role of secondary markets as a source of default (instead of an inherited
debt overhang); it takes into account the internal balance of political power, allowing for
the emergence of the friction between the decentralized source of demand for debt to be
repatriated - the elite - and the social planner, who instead has an incentive to default on
foreigners; it considers repatriations of private debt, a more general problem than buybacks as
the policymaker is not the issuer of debt. The role of secondary markets within a framework
with private debt is also present in Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010) (henceforth BMV)
and our model therefore merges the main intuitions of BR and BMV.
Sovereign authority, capital controls, and private debt. Regardless of the type,
stringency, practical implementation, and duration, capital controls share one feature: they
are imposed by the sovereign on the rest of the economy.11 This is an unsurprising remark,
the implications of which are however not generally taken into account in theoretical models
of international debt (exceptions are Wright (2006), Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010),
and Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura (2014)). Consider, for instance, that a sovereign
imposing strict capital controls on outflows could effectively force a default12 on payments
owed by private domestic agents to foreign creditors, even in the case when domestic debtors
are willing and able to pay.13 The possibility of such an occurrence is normally referred
to as transfer risk and is empirically relevant for international capital markets (Claessens
and Embrechts, 2003; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2006). However, a blanket foreign payments
moratorium hides the fact that there are really two distinct mechanisms at play. First, direct
repayments from domestic debtors to foreign creditors are blocked. Second, a change of debt
ownership from foreign to domestic investors is prevented.
To illustrate the first point practically, consider the example of a German corporation
that in July 1932 issued the following announcement to its US bondholders, two weeks before
7 million dollars in gold bonds it had issued under New York law came to maturity:
The German Foreign Exchange Control having denied permission for the transfer out
of Germany of sufficient funds to pay the above described Notes in cash at maturity,
the undersigned [..] offers to repay [..] five percent of [..] principal in cash, and the
balance by the issue of [..] six per cent Guaranteed Gold Notes, Due July 15, 1937[..]14
Shortly thereafter, all private German debtors were required to service their foreign-
currency debt in domestic currency (the Reichsmark) and to make the payments to the
Konversionskasse, a governmental body (an offshoot of the Reichsbank, the German central
11We consider cases where the sovereign is able to impose the controls de facto and not only de jure.
12For the sake of argument, assume sudden and unexpected capital controls and no collateral or debtor
foreign assets for the creditors to seize.
13A financial embargo imposed on a third country could have similar effects, as it disrupts trade and financial
relations between the target country and the rest of the world.
14From Kuczynski (1933). Foreign bondholders never got the full amount of either the interest payments or
the principal, not in 1937 nor later.
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bank at the time). To extract payments, foreign bondholders had to interact with the
Konversionskasse instead of the original debt issuer.
This last aspect also highlights that, when the sovereign takes control of capital flows,
private commercial debt can exhibit properties typical of sovereign debt, namely the difficulty
in enforcing contracts. In the example above, to the foreign bondholder it did not matter
whether the original issuer of the defaulted bond was a private company, a municipality, or
the German government itself: the situation de jure had been clearly superseded by a de
facto situation where the foreign bondholder had to deal with the German government as
if it were holding sovereign debt.15 For this reason, we can study aspects of private debt
defaults and repatriations within the familiar framework of sovereign defaults models.
We implicitly assume that sovereign-like debt is enforceable, though not necessarily in
the same way as private debt under foreign law. This assumption is the direct punishment
approach, which better captures the legal and institutional framework by summarizing the
debtor-creditor relationship with the power to enforce contracts and extract repayments
(refer to Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009) for a review of the literature on
sovereign defaults and the different theoretical approaches). A pure reputation-based ap-
proach does not easily allow for this treatment of sovereign debt, in some cases explicitly
assuming that it is unenforceable, as in Grossman and Van Huyck (1988)16. Buchheit,
DeLong, Chabert, and Zettlemeyer (2019) highlight the importance of analyzing the insti-
tutional and legal framework in debt crises, also with respect to secondary markets, while
Schumacher, Trebesch, and Enderlein (2018) show how legal recourse against sovereign de-
faults has become over time an increasingly powerful tool for creditors, perhaps replacing the
need for supersanctions observed before the 1950s (Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer,
2009). As an example of the applicability of the direct punishment approach in our empir-
ical setting, consider the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr by France and Belgium in order to
directly extract reparations after Germany failed to deliver various shipments of commodities
pursuant to the reparation schedule of the Versailles Treaty.
The case study. Empirically, we revisit the large-scale debt repatriation episode that
took place in Germany in the 1930s. Repatriations started as a private initiative in 1931,
before capital controls were imposed, and at their peak in 1933, amounted to 2% of German
GDP. In total, 33% of all German long-term foreign debt was repatriated to Germany by
private German investors (Klug, 1993).
The episode offers an ideal setting for our framework. First, the Nazi government’s
goal of autarky (Ritschl, 2012) implies that capital controls can be considered exogenous
to our problem, i.e. the government did not set capital controls in order to allow gains
from debt repatriations. Second, the scarcity of foreign exchange was significant: foreign
reserves fell from around 62% of the monetary base in 1930 to 2.2% in 1934 and 1% in
15This consideration holds both in cases of strategic (voluntary) or involuntary default.
16“Sovereign debts [..] are above the law”, “[..]the power to abrogate commitments [is] the essential property
of sovereignty”, “[..] historical cases in which one sovereign [..] seized the assets of another [..] sovereign
who is failing to service its debts involve infringement of sovereignty”, from Grossman and Van Huyck
(1988), page 1088. For a legal perspective on the issue of sovereign immunity refer to Weidemaier (2014).
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1938 (Ellis, 1940a). Alternative uses of foreign reserves to repatriations were not only the
imports needed for Hitler’s rearmament and full employment plans, but also the bilateral
negotiations with creditor countries in which debt-servicing was traded for imports. This
meant that there was no room for splurging foreign currency on repatriations. Third, because
of the previous two points, Germany did not have its reputation on international financial
markets at heart in any way. Moreover, the creditor front had broken up early on (Toniolo,
2005) and instead of punishing Germany for its default decision, creditor countries were
competing with each other to offer favourable trade deals to Germany in order to extract
some of the scarce foreign exchange left in the country. Fourth, despite the scarcity of foreign
reserves, influential individuals and companies - as well as the Nazi Party itself - were allowed
by German authorities to carry out debt repatriations for their own profit.
German capital control regulations were extremely complex. This led, in practice, to
different ways of extracting economic gains from repatriations. The driving force behind
all these operations, however, was the difference valuation of the debt between foreign and
domestic investors. Since this could not be arbitraged away due to the exchange controls, it
led to the large spread between German securities traded in Berlin and international financial
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Figure 1: The index price of German 6% Bonds in Berlin and New York.
Source: Institut für Konjunkturforschung (1933, 1936). Monthly frequency from January 1928 until October
1935. In 1931, the Berlin stock exchange was only open between the 1st of January and the 12th of July
and from the 3rd to the 18th of August. Regular trading started again in April 1932. In March 1935, the
coupon of the 6% bonds traded in Berlin was reduced to 4.5%.
Differences in how exactly profits could be realized through repatriations existed, however,
depending on whether the recipient of foreign exchange was a firm, a private investor, or an
organization. The simplest instance was as follows: a private German investor would request
foreign reserves from the Reichsbank and, if authorized, these funds would be earmarked for
the specific operation of buying any one of the foreign currency-denominated German bonds
trading at a discount in e.g. New York or London; once repatriated to Germany, these
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bonds would be often legally converted into securities in Reichsmarks. Converted or not, the
debt issuer would service its debt in RM to a specifically designed institution, the previously
mentioned Konversionskasse; the German creditor would get full payment (in RM) of interest
and principal from the Konversionskasse and, from January 1934, the owner of the asset
could sell it on the German market. Below, we also illustrate a more complex repatriation
mechanics - Figure 13 in appendix C.2 provides a visual representation of the scheme - but
the economic consequences of different repatriation modes were essentially identical to the
basic typology just presented here.
We rationalize the behavior of the German authorities as a way to reward supporters and
allies, which we characterize as the elite, in line with James (2020). Unfortunately, complete
records of individual repatriation operations have not survived.17 We thus use partial quan-
titative information as well as historical evidence to substantiate our interpretation. The
existing literature on favouritism and elite capture in Nazi Germany also supports our read-
ing of events. Ferguson and Voth (2008), for example, have shown that firms with ties to the
Nazi regime outperformed on the stock market in comparison with firms without such ties.
We argue that access to repatriations was an additional channel of rewarding supporters and
influential figures. In addition to a reward, repatriations were also a tool of control, which
supported the Nazi’s totalitarian goals. In a world of strict capital controls private compa-
nies were eager to trade more interference in their operations for coveted foreign exchange
concessions (Kobrak, 2003).
It should not be surprising that the Nazi party was more than willing to put the bureau-
cratic might of the state behind its political objectives, even if the overall economic gains
were limited or even negative. A counterpoint to the reward of allies in Nazi Germany was
the persecution of other groups, above all Jewish Germans. As recently shown by Ritschl
(2019), for the systematic dispossession of Jews, and by Huber, Lindenthal, and Waldinger
(2020), for the ”aryanizations” of private firms, these policies were not the source of any
substantial windfall for Germany as a whole, when they were not downright destructive.
In addition to studying both the mechanics and political economy of German debt repa-
triations, we collect and analyze nine years of weekly spreads between prices of German
securities traded in New York and in London18 and their equivalent in Berlin. Consistently
with our model and our interpretation of the episode, we show that the crucial factor for the
origination, variation and persistence of the spreads was the impact of capital controls on
private German investors trading on secondary markets.
17Anecdotal sources report that the vaults and archives of two institutions key to the implementation of
capital controls, namely the Konversionskasse and the Golddiskontbank - both offshoots of the Reichsbank
-, were located in what became East Berlin and were destroyed or looted upon Soviet occupation. We could
not confirm this, but it is known that before the London Debt Conference in 1952 Germany and the US
went through a process of verification of which German bonds were held outside of Germany before the
end of the war (the so-called Validation Law). This was done to prevent that repayments decided in the
London Debt Conference and meant for U.S. creditors would go to holders of looted converted bonds from
the Golddiskontbank’s vaults (the originals bonds were kept upon conversion) (U.S. Department of State
Bulletin, 1952a,b).
18For London, we extend with original sources the dataset of Brown and Burdekin (2002).
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We thus provide the first complete account of the German repatriations, an episode that
has attracted the attention of both contemporary and modern economists. We achieve this
by relying on both primary and secondary sources, as well as economic theory. Our primary
contribution in this respect is combining the incentives of the German authorities, foreign
creditors, and Germans engaging in the repatriations within a fully internally consistent
framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. the next section provides an overview of
the literature on different theoretical aspects touched upon in this paper. Section 3 presents
a model of debt repatriations under a non-utilitarian government. Section 4 presents relevant
background on German debt and the repatriations mechanism. Section 5 presents our case
study, subdivided in three fundamental questions, namely i) why did repatriations start as
a private initiative in 1931, ii) what explains the price differential between German bonds
traded domestically or abroad, and iii) what explains the policy choices of the authorities.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Besides the literature on the German debt repatriation episode19, we contribute to several
open debates in international macroeconomics and finance. We discuss these below.
Secondary markets. Although recent work has started to highlight the importance of
secondary markets for sovereign debt20, their role has been largely neglected and is still
only partially understood in macroeconomics. In practice, however, secondary markets have
played an important role during many sovereign debt crises. For example, it has been argued
that in the South American debt crisis of the 1980s secondary markets led to the emergence
of a class of small creditors prone to litigation that endangered the results of “the collective
negotiation and debt restructuring so crucial to resolving the [...] debt crisis” (Power, 1996).
Alfaro and Vogel (2006), on the contrary, argue that hold-out creditors could positively
impact sovereign debt markets by demonstrating the enforceability of contracts; Ahmed and
Alfaro (2017) find in an empirical analysis that the impact of hold-out creditors on markets
is positive for some South-American countries and negative for others. Pitchford and Wright
(2012) propose a model of hold-outs in sovereign debt renegotiations suggesting that trying
to limit hold-outs might be unfeasible and would lead to longer debt restructuring delays.
The possibility of debt ownership change through secondary markets is fundamental be-
cause it allows foreign creditors to be, at least partially, repaid by selling their claims to
domestic creditors, thereby circumventing any block on direct repayments. Only by con-
trolling secondary markets is the sovereign fully able to acquire a discrimination technology
19For work on the broader issues on the German economy in the 1930s, see Ritschl (2013); Ritschl and
Sarferaz (2014); De Broeck and James (2019).
20For instance, during the European debt crisis of the early 2010s and its aftermath a considerable portion
of sovereign debt was repatriated by domestic agents in crisis countries (Brutti and Sauré, 2016; Beck,
Georgiadis, and Gräb, 2016; Della Corte and Federico, 2019; Emter, Schmitz, and Tirpák, 2019).
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against repayments to foreign bondholders. This is the core of the Secondary Market Hy-
pothesis put forward by Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2008, 2010), where well-functioning
secondary markets serve as an enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt even when default
penalties are low. Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura (2014) extend BMV by including
crowding-out of productive domestic investments because private agents repatriate their
domestic sovereign debt instead of investing. Our paper contributes to the literature by
bringing these mechanisms to a world with impaired markets, combining the main intuition
of BR with that of BMV and showing how the private incentive to repatriate debt interacts
with the social planner’s dual objective to avoid that scarce resources leave the country while
rewarding the elite.
Creditor discrimination and domestic default. Selective defaults - default episodes
in which different categories of creditors are treated differently - are far from rare; on the
contrary, a differential treatment of domestic and foreign debtors has characterized over 80%
of all sovereign defaults since 1980 (Erce and Mallucci, 2018). Despite this fact, studies on
the topic are few and far between. Most of the literature assumes that domestic creditors
enjoy preferential treatment relative to foreign investors. This is not an unreasonable as-
sumption: Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) document that most sovereign defaults are selective
against foreigners, and when domestic default occurs it is with low levels of foreign debt.
BMV show that this assumption provides the incentive for private domestic investors to
repatriate their debt: if the government cannot prevent repatriations, then debt obligations
will be enforced as there is no welfare gain from domestic default. This same mechanism
underpins the aforementioned Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura (2014). Guembel and Suss-
man (2009) provide a political economy model of sovereign debt where default on foreign
creditors happens when debt distribution implies that the interests of the median voter are
in contrast with those of creditors. In Erce and Dı́az-Cassou (2010) the government can
discriminate against either foreign or domestic agents, depending on the source of liquid-
ity pressure, banking intermediation levels, and perceived strength of the domestic banking
system. D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016) study domestic default in a heterogeneous-agents
model without secondary markets and no creditor discrimination. They show that default
costs and a non-utilitarian social planner are necessary to ensure debt sustainability and
avoid a domestic default. Their calibrated model on Spanish data matches the empirical
findings of Reinhart and Rogoff on the occurrence of domestic defaults. Erce and Mallucci
(2018) document how distribution of debt among domestic and foreign creditors influences
selective defaults, together with the role of legal jurisdiction and not only creditor residence.
For a general overview of the literature on sovereign debt and defaults, the reader can refer
to Aguiar and Amador (2014).
Institutions and political risk. We also contribute to the literature on institutions
and political/sovereign risk (Lucas, 1990; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan,
and Volosovych, 2007; Schularick and Steger, 2008). Our case study spans macroeconomic
policy, institutions, and sovereign risk, of which transfer risk is a relevant component. While
in this literature lower quality institutions lead to higher sovereign risk, which can entail a
higher transfer risk through the mechanism of capital controls, we show how capital con-
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trols can reinforce the decline in institutional quality. This paper therefore contributes by
providing an example of how relationship-based capitalism affects sovereign risk through in-
stitution quality and how capital controls can affect capital flows also indirectly by enabling
institutional decline in the first place, possibly in a positive feedback relation.
3 A model of debt repatriations
3.1 Model
We consider an optimization problem where a government must allocate an endowment
of a scarce resource W - foreign reserves - between public spending G and an amount X
earmarked for private debt repatriations. The timeline of events is summarized in Figure 2.
X is given to a group of citizens21 who are thus authorized to carry out debt repatriations
and make a profit on the operation: capital gains are realized by buying the debtor’s country
private debt in international markets - if it trades at a discount - and reselling it on the
domestic market where it trades at face value. The difference in price stems from capital
controls, which affect repayments to foreigners but not to domestic citizens. Every citizen
inherits a unit of debt issued in a previous period to foreign creditors so that total debt
D0 also represents debtor population size. All debt is private and when issued it is pooled
together from all citizens and securitized at no cost, so that every unit of debt traded both in
the primary and secondary market bundles the same fraction of individual debt from every
citizen.
The government of the debtor country sets the degree φc of an isolationist policy between
zero (complete isolation of the country from international capital markets) and one (complete
openness). When the parameter is less than unity, only a proportion of private resources φc
is allowed to be paid back to creditors, effectively shielding the remaining proportion (1−φc)
from being seized by creditors when the debt is due. This amounts to a decision imposed
by the government on its citizens to (partially) default on foreign creditors.22 The choice
of the degree of isolationist policy is assumed to be exogenous to the repatriation problem
considered here, for example based on long-term political considerations.
3.1.1 Government
The government allocates an endowment of foreign reserves W between two uses, G and X,
such that
W = G+X (1)
where all quantities involved are non-negative.23 G is spending on a public good that
21Citizens populate the same country and inherit the same amount of debt. We refer to all debtors collectively
as the debtor country. Creditors are risk-neutral foreigners who operate in international capital markets.
22From the point of view of the creditors, this remains a strategic default.
23This is a similar mechanism, though simpler, than Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura (2014), where
repatriations displace resources for productive investments. This would only give additional reasons to keep
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• Citizens inherit debt;
• Endowments are
realized.
• Government assigns X
based on social welfare
function;
• Production of public
good G begins.




• Debt repayments are
made;
• Public good delivered.
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
Figure 2: Timeline
affects all citizens equally and X is an amount only given to government supporters, a sub-
group of all citizens. X is used by the supporters to repatriate domestic debt held abroad so
that they can reap private benefits in the form of capital gains. Without X, citizens cannot
carry out debt repatriation operations and only the government can decide on the amount
of X supplied. Isolationist policy φc and government control over X represent two different
channels of capital controls: φc affects debt servicing directly, while control over X impacts
secondary markets and therefore limits debt ownership changes between foreign creditors
and citizens. Citizens have to pay for X from their own endowments24 but this amount
does not contribute to W (see Figure 2). The government chooses the socially optimal level
of X such that it maximizes U , a weighted sum of incomes of two mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive groups of citizens, namely supporters s and non-supporters ns:
U = αD0ωsys[X] + (1− α)D0(1− ωs)yns[X] (2)
The incomes of groups s and ns are ys[X] and yns[X] respectively, where square brackets
denote that they are a function of X; ys and yns will be later discussed in detail. Out of
population D0, the share of supporters is ωs and consequently D0ωs and D0(1− ωs) are the
group size of supporters and non-supporters, respectively. Finally, 0.5 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a struc-
tural parameter that represents government preference for its supporters. The social welfare
function U should then be interpreted in terms of preferences over groups, while taking into
account group sizes. The double-weighing system with α and ωs in equation (2) denotes the
presence of elite capture, where a small group of citizens can have a disproportionate effect
on the social planner’s allocation of resources.25
repatriations under strict control.
24For tractability, we assume at parity.
25D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016) offer an example of related work where the social planner is not utilitarian.
However, their model does not take group size into account: when the only weight in the social welfare
function represents a biased preference for a group over another, group sizes are implicitly taken as equal.
Different group sizes are important to describe a variety of historically significant episodes such as i) an
oppressed minority (e.g. the Jewish persecution during the 1930-40s in Germany), ii) a minority oppressing
the majority of the population (e.g. Apartheid).
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3.1.2 International Markets and Creditors26
For a given X, the remaining amount of outstanding debt Dx held by foreign creditors after
repatriations is
Dx = D0 −X/Px (3)
where Px is the post-repatriation price of the debt. Given that repatriations simply amount
to purchasing debt on the open market, Px must also reflect the value of debt for creditors
who do not sell, that is, the expected repayments at maturity Rx divided by outstanding
debt post-repatriation
Px = Rx/Dx. (4)






Equation (5) tells us that, given a pre-repatriation debt ofD0, the relation betweenX and
Rx is essential for price dynamics. As an example, if Rx were unaffected by X then the full
amount of X could be seen as a transfer of resources to creditors (through the open-market
operation of nominal value X) that would have otherwise never been recovered by them.
Expectations of repayments Rx are formed rationally by creditors who possess the same
information as government and citizens and solve the government’s planning problem. Rx is
based on a publicly known enforcement technology27 σ at disposal of creditors, which allows
them to seize debtor assets as a function of total private resources net of X, conditional on
the openness of capital markets28:
Rx = min{σ[X|Yp, φc], Dx} (6)
where Yp is the total amount of private resources in the debtor economy that form the
base for the repayment of debt and φc is the degree of capital controls exogenously set by
the government. Government resources W are outside of creditors’ reach.
Function σ satisfies conditions 1 > ∂σ/∂Yp ≥ 0 and 0 ≥ ∂σ/∂X > −1 meaning that
creditors gain from additional resources they can seize in the debtor economy but less than
one-for-one.29 Function σ defines the relation between X and Rx, whose importance is
highlighted in equation (5), and consequently its choice will drive debt repatriation (the
26The first two equations of this sub-section are from Bulow and Rogoff (1991) and we use the same notation
when possible.
27In a strategic (i.e. voluntary) partial default, the threat of enforcement makes the debtor pay the remaining
(non-defaulted) debt, i.e. the debtor will be indifferent between having σ resources seized or voluntarily
repaying the same amount – but not more.
28The example of the Konversionskasse previously mentioned in the introduction shows how enforcement
might be affected by capital controls.
29Intuitively, the value of σ cannot be higher than available resources Yp, as it represents a costly enforcement
process in a case of strategic default. If σ[X|Yp, φc] < Dx when Yp ≥ Dx, X = 0 and φc = 1, then σ can be
interpreted as allowing for subsistence income that has priority over debt repayments.
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amount of X chosen by the government) through its impact on the price, effectively linking
φc with control over secondary markets. Specifying the relation between a non-zero Rx
and X also leads to partial repatriations (Dx > 0)
30. An example of a capital controls
implementation scheme is shown in equation (7) where we assume creditors seize a positive
fraction β, constant and less than unity, of available resources:
σa[X|Yp, φc] = βφc(Yp −X) (7)
Function σ effectively represents the implementation of capital controls: How exactly do
private agents finance the repatriation operations? We are interested in particular in how X
affects the availability of resources that can be claimed by foreign creditors.
In our reference case σa (7) the assumption is that a portion φc of funds X is taken
from domestic resources Yp within creditors’ reach (thus reducing their claims through σa),
while the remaining portion (1−φc) of X is taken from funds that are otherwise completely
shielded from creditors. The amount (1− φc)X does not reduce creditors’ claims through σ
and we can therefore think of σa as a “neutral” case in which funds X are taken at the same
time (respectively in proportion (1 − φc) and φc) from shielded and unprotected domestic
resources Yp. This implies that X and σa are always negatively correlated.
The effect of an increase of X on Px is always non-negative, however the magnitude
of the price variation ultimately depends on σ. Different choices of σ would give rise to
different ∂Px/∂X even with the same φc and β, therefore allowing different dynamics of
Px
31. This shows that the effect of capital controls on debt repatriations manifests itself not
only through the amount of resources involved in the default episode, but, as importantly,
also through the structure of capital markets.
3.1.3 Domestic market and citizens
Before defining Yp, the amount of private domestic resources that plays a role at the macro
level, we consider the resources available to each citizen. Citizens are rational and maxi-
mize their own income ys,ns. Every citizen, government supporter or not, receives the same
amount of endowments ε. We remind the reader of the debt securitization assumption and
that outstanding debt for each citizen is normalized to one so the total amount of debt
in the country, D0, also represents population size. Citizens are exogenously divided into
government supporters s and non-supporters ns, each group respectively of size ωsD0 and
(1− ωs)D0, with 1 ≥ ωs ≥ 0. Citizens have to repay the unit of debt issued in the previous
period. Given φc, after repatriations each citizen will repay an amount ρ:
ρ[X] = PxDx/D0 + (X/Px)/D0 = Rx/D0 + (D0 −Dx)/D0 (8)
30To see this, note that when β = 0 (the case of BMV) eq.(5) becomes Px = X/D0, which then simplifies in
(3) to get Dx = 0. BMV propose a variation of their model (Example 9, page 1544) that allows for what
can be interpreted as debt repatriations under impaired secondary markets. However, also in that case all
debt is repatriated.
31In Appendix A we consider different cases for σ and discuss the connection with corporate debt buybacks.
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where the second equality follows from equations (4) and (3) applied to the first and second
term respectively. The first term represents repayments to foreign bondholders (affected by
capital controls), with an outstanding amount after repatriations Dx traded at price Px. The
second term represents total debt repayments made domestically at face value, where X/Px
is debt repatriated. Both terms are divided by population size D0 so that ρ represents debt
repayments per capita.
The government provides a public good G that equally affects all citizens, whose indi-
vidual private benefit from the public good is γ(W −X)/D0, where 1 > γ ≥ 0 is a constant
and W −X = G comes from the government budget constraint (1).
Supporter demand for X will be positive if supporters profit from the operation in the
form of capital gains. However, when X is positive every citizen (supporter or not) suffers
from both i) a decrease in the provision of public good and ii) higher debt repayments ρ to
other domestic agents due to the repatriated bonds.
Under full information, each citizen of the supporter group is aware that other supporters
want to engage in repatriation operations and will thus internalize the detrimental effects
of other supporters’ repatriations. Citizens also know that the government is aware of their
preferences and that it will allow a non-negative socially optimal amount of X following (2).
We assume that, within the group s, there is no particular pecking order for the allocation of
reserves so that the total amount of X supplied by the government is equally shared among
all supporters, i.e. X/(ωsD0), and that this sharing rule is known to citizens.
Summing up all the elements discussed until now, we get the individual supporter income

























The amount of debt repatriated minus the cost of repatriation form the individual private
gains from repatriations, where both terms depend on the individual amount of resources
available, namely X/(ωsD0). For the second term and in ρ, on the other hand, what matters
is the total amount of reserves X used for repatriations, as this affects the government budget
constraint and aggregate quantities Rx and Dx.
Non-supporters are not allowed to participate in repatriations, so the income for each





Both ys and yns are post-repatriation resources so the whole amount cannot be considered
as part of Yp, the total private resources that form the base of seizable assets. If we exclude
capital gains (as they are themselves part of the repatriation operation) and public goods
(e.g. roads and armaments) then it is only endowments ε for the whole population that
contribute to term Yp, such that Yp =
∑
ε, where the summation applies to all citizens.
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For simplicity of exposition we rule out cases of “excusable” default implying that, with no
capital controls and repatriations, ε is enough to cover outstanding debt.
3.2 Results
The government chooses X∗, the optimal value of X, by maximizing social welfare (2) sub-
ject to resource constraint (1), given: equations (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), (9), (10), structural
parameters α, ωs, φc, β, γ, D0, and W , and one among (7), (15a), and (15b). We retain σa
(7) as our reference case for the proof that will follow as it is ”neutral” and easily tractable
without loss of generality.
Result 1. A utilitarian social planner, i.e. with no bias for either group (α = 0.5), is a
sufficient condition for a socially optimal X∗ = 0.
Proof. The FOC of the social planner’s optimization problem can be written as:
every citizen
︷ ︸︸ ︷




























When α = 0.5, the FOC simplifies to −∂Rx/∂X = 1 + γ, which under σa is βφc = 1 + γ,
where, however, βφc < 1 + γ always holds irrespective of (admissible) parameter values.
Therefore, the boundary value X∗ = 0 maximizes the social welfare function. It can be eas-
ily verified that the same result holds under σb and σc and, more generally, when −∂Rx/∂X
is less than 1 + γ.
Result 2. The necessary condition for X∗ to be positive is α > 0.5. Under this condition
there exist wide ranges of all other structural parameters such that X∗ > 0.
Proof. It follows from analysis of the FOC (11) (see also appendix A).
Result 2 can be easily observed in Figure 3. Each boxplot summarizes the distribution
of X∗ for 50625 different combinations of underlying values of the structural parameters,
given a value of α and fixing D0 = 100. It shows our main result that when α = 0.5,
X∗ = 0 independently of the combination of the other structural parameters. Additionally,
it conveys the intuition that the greater the value of α, the wider the range of structural
parameters that lead to X∗ > 0 and the greater the highest attainable magnitude of X∗ (on
the vertical axis). In appendix A we provide evidence for alternative specifications of σ.
Two important parameters are α and ωs, as they directly and jointly affect the social
welfare function. A closer analysis of equation (11) reveals that, indeed, an increase in ωs
always reduces the gains from additional X and is not dependent on α. On the other hand,
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Figure 3: Boxplot of the distribution of X∗ for different values of α.
For each value of α, the model is solved for all combinations of 15 values for each of the parameters β, γ, ωs,
φc, for a total of 50625 grid points for each value of α. The 15 values are: (0.025, 0.05, 0.10, 0.125, 0.15,
0.20, 0.25, 0.35, 0.45, 0.55, 0.65, 0.75, 0.85, 0.95, 0.975). Horizontal axis is not to scale.
the magnitude of the effect of an increase in α does depend on ωs: it is invariably positive
when ωs < 0.5 and ambiguous otherwise, in the latter case depending also on the values of
the other structural parameters.32
Figure 4 depicts an example of how the two parameters affect X∗; the graph is based
on specific values of β, γ, and φc, but it is representative of most combinations of these
parameters. In fact, our general results are not driven by the choice of values of other
structural parameters. For instance, γ is not the main source of detrimental effects of
repatriations: a lower value of γ (a lower loss of forfeiting public spending) does indeed
increase the area in the space (α, ωs) where X
∗ > 0 (i.e. the black contour line in graph 4b
is pushed up and left) and does not affect the maximum level of X∗ attainable in that space.
However, the detrimental effect of higher repatriations on social welfare remains predominant
through the channel of ρ (equation 8).
Both a smaller β and a smaller φc reduce the maximum X
∗ attainable with any combi-
nation of α and ωs, and they both increase the area in the space (α, ωs) where X
∗ > 0. To
show this point, Figure 5 plots the percentage of possible combinations of α and ωs that lead
to X∗ > 0, as a function of φc and for different representative combinations of β and γ.
33
The role of ωs (the supporters group size) stands out when considering a larger group,
everything else equal: ωs = 1 (all citizens are favoured) corresponds to the case of BR, where
collective and group interests match perfectly and therefore X∗ = 0. If an individual within
32See appendix A for further details. and for comparisons with the closest literature.
33This is calculated as the area of the projection of the surface X∗[α, ωs]|X
∗ > 0 on the (α, ωs) plane.
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(a) 3-dimensional (b) 2-dimensional
Figure 4: A representative example of X∗ as a function of α and ωs, for given values of β, γ, and φc.
Note that the α axis begins at 0.5. Black line in right panel is the boundary between zero and positive
solution sets.
Figure 5: Percentage of possible combinations of α and ωs that lead to X
∗ > 0, as a function of φc and for
different representative combinations of β and γ. Reverse scale for φc: moving to the right increases capital
controls.
the group could deviate from the government decision, then she would make capital gains
at the expense of all others: the government solves exactly this coordination problem. In
general, when X∗ > 0, the higher the number of citizens allowed to engage in repatriations,
the lower X∗ becomes, until it quickly reaches zero again; note that ωs need not necessarily
reach unity for X∗ = 0. This happens because, as ωs increases, the collective detrimental
effects of repatriations in the form of higher domestic repayments in ρ are gradually internal-
ized by more supporters and capital gains cannot compensate for this (eq. 11). Conversely,
decreasing ωs when X
∗ > 0 will lead to a higher X∗.
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4 The many guises of default: German foreign debt
and repatriations in the 1930s
Having established our theoretical framework, we now turn to the case study: Nazi Germany.
In this section we provide the historical background and highlight the main characteristics
of the German debt repatriations. The case study complements and supports our theoret-
ical model in three ways. First, we show that the incentives of the actors involved in the
repatriations - foreign creditors and German investors - are consistent with those described
in our model. Second, we show that elite capture and control can explain the otherwise puz-
zling actions of the German authorities. Finally, we show that secondary markets played a
fundamental role in the German episode, consistently with the secondary market hypothesis
of BMV which underpins our theoretical framework.
4.1 Background
In the aftermath of World War I, the winning powers imposed a heavy reparation payments
burden on a defeated Germany.34 The country, however, defaulted on reparations payments
practically from the start. Moreover, its policy of passive resistance to the ensuing Franco-
Belgian occupation of the Ruhr contributed to the country spiraling into a devastating
hyperinflation in 1923, which was brought under control with the decisive contribution of a
specially appointed currency commissioner Hjalmar Schacht.
In order to help Germany maintain its monetary stability and meet reparation payments,
the Dawes Plan of 1924 established a new reparations payment schedule and a loan35 with
maturity in 1949, the proceeds of which went to Germany (Clement, 2004). More impor-
tantly, however, the Dawes Plan made reparation payments de facto junior with respect to
commercial debts. Germany, with its heavy - yet potentially manageable, and now junior -
debt burden in the forms of reparations, was therefore in the position to attract considerable
capital inflows (Ritschl, 2013). As a result, through the second half of the 1920s, all sectors
of the German economy borrowed heavily on international capital markets. By the end of
the decade, the US was Germany’s principal creditor, with holdings of over 40% of the total
foreign private and public debt. Accordingly, the dollar was the principal currency of denom-
ination. Germany’s industry was the principal debtor in the country, accounting for almost
62% of total foreign debts. A large share - around 46% - of German foreign commercial
debt was short term i.e. with a maturity of less than a year. Appendix C.1 provides further
details to the interested reader.
34Its amount - the so-called London Schedule of Payments - was established by the protocol prepared by the
Inter-Allied Reparations Commission in 1921, but uncertainty remained as to how much Germany would
eventually have to pay. For details, see Schuker (1988).
35In the form of seven percent gold bonds, the majority of which were issued in the US and Great Britain,
with other minor blocks issued in France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Italy, in the
respective local currency. The principal amounted to the equivalent of close to a billion Reichsmarks at the
prevailing exchange rates at issuance. The proceeds were paid to Germany in gold and foreign exchange.
The service of the Dawes bonds was a direct and unconditional obligation of Germany (Auld, 1934).
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This arrangement was eventually reversed by the Young Plan, drafted and adopted be-
tween 1929 and 1930. This re-established the seniority of reparations with respect to commer-
cial debts, thus endangering creditors’ claims, while also formally ending the hopes of many
foreign commercial creditors that a portion of the reparations would be forgiven (Ritschl,
2012, 2013).36 By this time, foreign commercial debts had reached 32.6 billion Reichsmarks,
and with the inclusion of reparations, Germany’s foreign debt in 1930 amounted to 67.6
billion Reichsmarks, or 81.5% of GDP (Table 1). The inevitable sudden stop of capital
inflows in early 1929 was then followed by the start of the Great Depression, which meant
that Germany’s economic and financial health quickly deteriorated. In 1931, the country
experienced a full-blown twin crisis in which fiscal troubles, the foreign debt burden and the
fragility of the banking sector fed off each other in a downward spiral (Schnabel, 2004a).37
Following a sharp fall in GDP, the foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio reached its peak at the end of
1931 exceeding 100% (Ritschl, 2013).38
Year GDP Reserves, Private and Reparations Total Debt Debt/GDP Repatriations Repatriations/
% of M0 Public Debt (NPV) (2)+(3) (4)/(1) (5) Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)/(4)
1928 89.05 68.6% 27.0 40 67.0 75.2% - -
1929 89.25 56.3% 31.0 46 77.0 86.3% - -
1930 82.93 61.6% 32.6 35 67.6 81.5% - -
1931 69.15 25.2% 33.6 34 67.6 97.8% 0.30 0.4%
1932 56.44 26.7% 25.9 - 25.9 45.9% 0.86 3.3%
1933 57.72 11.4% 23.2 - 23.2 40.2% 1.18 5.1%
1934 64.38 2.2% 18.1 - 18.1 28.1% 0.58 3.2%
1935 71.75 2.2% 17.3δ - 17.3 24.1% 0.54 3.1%
1936 79.65 1.5% 16.4 - 16.4 20.6% 0.30 1.8%
1937 89.11 1.5% 14.8 - 14.8 16.6% 0.15 1.0%
1938 99.19 1.0% 13.9 - 13.9 14.0% 0.19 1.4%
Table 1: German GDP, foreign debt, and debt repatriations, billions of Reichsmarks.
Source: the debt series is from Bundesbank (1976), the GDP and reparations series are from Ritschl (2013),
the debt repatriation series is from Klug (1993) for 1932-38 while the figure for 1931 is our lower bound
estimate based on archival evidence from Germany Country File, Bank of England Archive OV34/148:
Special advisory Committee Basel 1931 and OV34/179: Germany Moratorium. Report of the committee
appointed to examine and interpret the figures submitted by the Reichsbank, May 30th 1933. The large
decline in reparations in 1930 is due to the different NPV of the new schedule of payments introduced with
the Young Plan. Reserves and M0 (the monetary base) are from Ellis (1940a). Reserves: gold and foreign
currency; all values are end-of-year, except for 1928 where the figure for January 1929 is used. δ: the missing
figure is linearly interpolated.
36The Young plan superseded the Dawes plan and similarly it provided a new reparations schedule and
fresh bonds issuance. The Young bonds were issued mostly in French francs, dollars, sterling, and Swedish
crowns. The total amount, at the prevailing parities at issuance, was approximately a third higher than the
Dawes issuance. About half was issued in the US and Britain. The Dawes bonds service was maintained.
37A large literature exists on the 1931 crisis. See, for example, Ferguson and Temin (2003), Schnabel (2004b),
Ferguson and Temin (2004), Temin (2008), Schnabel (2009) and Ritschl and Sarferaz (2014).
38The figure in Table 1 refers to mid-1931, when the ratio had not yet reached the 100% mark.
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The German authorities reacted to the crisis by ratifying exchange controls in the summer
of 1931 in order to curb the massive capital flight the German economy was experiencing
(Bonnel, 1940; Child, 1958; James, 1985). Their principal feature, which was based on similar
legislation in place during World War I and the hyperinflation, was the restriction of the
availability of foreign exchange for individuals and companies, which was achieved by giving
the Reichsbank a monopoly over all foreign exchange operations (Hahn, 1989). Additionally,
the authorities also regulated the use of the foreign exchange they granted.39
As Germany’s debt crisis unfolded, substantial debt repatriations by German investors
began.40 Table 1 reports estimates reconstructed by Klug (1993) for 1932-1938. Klug be-
lieved pre-1932 repatriations to have been negligible, but our figure for 1931, estimated using
archival sources, highlights that the practice was already widespread then. Exchange con-
trols, however, limited the amount of repatriations that could be carried out and led to the
appearance of a spread between the price of German securities held abroad and in Germany,
since any difference in valuation of the securities between domestic and foreign investors
could not be easily arbitraged away.
Concomitantly to these developments, international creditors did attempt to offer some
relief to German debtors. On June 21, 1931, US President Hoover introduced a one-year
moratorium on German intergovernmental debts and reparations, while the Reichsbank re-
ceived a $100 million emergency loan from other central banks. In addition, the first Stand-
still Agreement - signed in August 1931 - meant that approximately 6.3 billion Reichsmarks
of German short-term debts were frozen (Clement, 2004).41 Finally, the Lausanne Confer-
ence of July 1932 de facto put an end to reparation payments, hugely reducing Germany’s
external debt.
Despite these measures and the improvement in Germany’s economy, the rise to power of
the NSDAP in January 1933 further pushed Germany down the path of external default. The
reinstitution of Hjalmar Schacht as president of the Reichsbank in March of the same year,
after his 1930 resignation over disaccord on the burden imposed by the Young Plan, and his
further appointment as head of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (Ministry of the Economy)
in August 1934 were particularly crucial events, as he was a strenuous and vocal opposer
of war reparations (Schacht, 1934; James, 1985). Marking the official start of Germany’s
foreign debt default, a new Law on Payments Abroad was approved in May 1933. The law
forced all foreign debts not covered by the Standstill Agreements - excluding interest and
amortization payments for the Dawes loan and the interest payments for the Young loans -
to be repaid through the Konversionskasse and reduced the service of debts to 75% of the
39 The allocation of foreign currency was at first established based on the requirements of the previous year.
In particular, in November 1931, it was established that 75% of previous year’s requirements of foreign
exchange would be allocated. In March 1932, the share was lowered to 35% and successively raised to 50%
(Klug, 1993). This arrangement lasted until 1934 (James, 1985), when even stricter controls on the use of
foreign exchange were established (Klug, 1993).
40Some debt repatriations also took place in the 1920s, but were quantitatively negligible (Klug, 1993).
41The agreement was renewed until 1939 with German debtors only making yearly partial payments.
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level of June 1933.42
The German government introduced aggressive measures even with regard to the Dawes
and Young loans, which had previously commanded a privileged status. In May 1933,
notwithstanding the protests of the Bank for International Settlements - the guarantor of
these loans - Germany unilaterally revoked the Gold Clause (Clement, 2004). This meant
that the loans would now be serviced in nominal rather than in the original gold value ba-
sis. The final act came in the spring of 1934, when Germany instituted a complete transfer
moratorium - enforced from July of that year - which formalized its default on all foreign
obligations (Ellis, 1941).
Although Germany’s default was by no means an exception - defaults took place in a
large number of countries in Latin America and Europe in the early 1930s - it was the largest
of the interwar era (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013). Moreover, no other country introduced a
system of foreign exchange controls that was as strict and pervasive as that of Germany.
One of the most striking aspects of this system was that it had all the characteristics of an
emergency measure, and were so perceived by most contemporaries, but ended up becoming
the defining feature of German foreign economic policy during the decade (Ellis, 1940a).
This system was also the foundation of the debt repatriations. By offering to the German
authorities the possibility of regulating the allocation of foreign exchange and the access
to secondary markets, it gave the NSDAP the chance to both reward and control domestic
companies and individuals, thus facilitating the pursue of the party’s political goals.
4.2 The repatriations
The first element of note with regard to the repatrations is that, as time passed, regulations
increased, the control of the authorities over the repatriations tightened and the process
became more and more ripe for arbitrariness and the pursuit of political objectives. The
second element to consider is that the incentive for German firms and individuals to carry
out these operations was their own gain, setting them apart from government-coordinated
repatriations (buybacks) episodes such as those that characterized the 1980s debt crises.
Despite their uncoordinated nature, the repatriations were large, reaching their peak at
2% of German GDP in 1933. This figure, however, still does not fully convey the importance
of the episode. Klug (1993) estimates that German debt repatriation amounted to almost
3% of 1932 global debt (of which Germany had a share of 14%). To put this in perspective,
in the 1980s 4.1% of the initial stock of debt was repatriated by several countries through
coordinated negotiated schemes. In total, as Klug further estimates, 33% of all German
long-term foreign debt was repatriated to Germany, which included 35% of all long-term
dollar-denominated debt. By 1936, German investors had repatriated 40% of all industrial
bonds issued in the US, in addition to municipal bonds, mortgage bonds and other types of
bonds.
The regulations surrounding the repatriations were many and often revised.43 In practice,
42See Appendix C.2 for details.
43As Ellis (1940a, page 9) recounts, there were “three general exchange-control laws, upwards of 50 separate
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however, these operations could be carried out in three main ways with the same fundamental
economic repercussions.
First, firms and individuals could directly request foreign currency to engage in a prof-
itable repatriation operation. The decision regarding the allocation of foreign exchange was
carried out by the regional tax authorities where the applicant resided following the guide-
lines of the German Minister of the Economy in conjunction with the German Minister of
Finance and the German Minister of Agriculture (Hahn, 1989). Any funds granted would
be earmarked for a specific operation that would then be reported back to the Reichsbank.
Before the stricter exchange controls implemented in 1934, domestic agents could bypass di-
rect approval by the authorities by buying foreign currency already eligible for repatriations
(at a substantial premium over standard foreign exchange) on the market. This aspect will
be further discussed in section 5.1.
Second, firms could also engage in repatriation operations by using part of their export
proceeds. If a company could demonstrate that its production costs exceeded world prices,
the Reichsbank may have granted it the possibility of purchasing German bonds. The system
thus essentially represented a way to depreciate the Reichsmark on some export markets,
while avoiding depreciation of the nominal exchange rate (Katona, 1934).
Whether purchased in simple financial transactions or through export proceeds, and
whether by the original issuer or another agent, the bonds could be converted into domestic
bonds after repatriation.44 Following conversion, the bonds would be serviced in Reichsmarks
and, from June 1934, could be sold on the domestic stock market.
The manner of repatriation also did not matter for the the gains to be realized. If the
buyer was not the original issuer, the bond could be either held to maturity or sold on at
the higher prices prevalent in Germany. If the debt was purchased by the original issuer,
accounting profits could be realized by extinguishing the bonds bought back below face value
(Kobrak, 2003).45 Besides accounting profits, it bears repeating that the blanket external
default enforced by the sovereign might not have served the needs of individual debtor
companies. They might have wished to continue servicing their foreign debts to preserve ties
with foreign counterparts. Buybacks offered the chance to not completely renege on foreign
obligations.
The third and final mode of carrying out repatriations was also tied to exports, the dif-
ference being that it involved blocked accounts and scrip rather than bonds and that the
Konversionskasse and Golddiskontbank, both entities controlled by the Reichsbank, played
an important mediating role between buyers and sellers. Both scrip and blocked accounts
were a product of the exchange control system themselves, being essentially arrears of Ger-
man foreign debt service. This form of repatriations became predominant after 1935 and
remained sizable until 1939 (Klug, 1993). In Appendix C.2 we provide details on these type
decrees of amendment and adaptation, and something in the neighborhood of 500 administrative rulings,
to say nothing of clearing, compensation, and payment agreements with partner countries”.
44See Appendix C.2 for details on conversions
45On average, only 50% of the export proceeds were used to repurchase bonds (at least officially), while the
rest was compulsorily handed over to the Reichsbank.
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of operations.
Repatriations tied to exports were the object of much debate by contemporaries, mainly
because the German government, in the cases when it officially acknowledged repatriations
operations, justified them as export subsidies.46 Heuser (1934), along with many contempo-
raries considered repatriations as a genuine way to subsidize German exports; Einzig (1934)
wrote that Germany had found a way of “eating [its] cake and keeping it”.
However, a number of authors have questioned this interpretation. Balogh (1938), Ellis
(1941), and Child (1958), for example, concurred on the fact that repatriations only gained
some importance in trade policy by mid-1932, while the practice had already started in 1931.
Ellis also expressed doubts as to whether the repurchase of bonds and blocked accounts could
be directly linked to genuinely additional exports, especially after 1933, when the perpet-
uation of exchange controls ceased to have an economic rationale and was, instead, based
on political objectives of the National Socialist regime. He also highlighted the arbitrariness
of the export subsidy procedure, akin to that present in the direct allocation of foreign ex-
change to private individuals (Ellis, 1940b). Finally, Klug (1993) provided archival evidence
that the Economics Ministry did not consider the price differential between New York and
Berlin to be high enough for the additional export practice to be beneficial, given the foreign
exchange shortage faced by Germany.
More fundamentally, the use of repatriations - whether of bonds, blocked accounts or
scrip - as subsidies rested on their limited scope. Unrestrained or large-scale repatriations
would have rapidly eroded the price spread between Germany and financial centers abroad,
thus reducing or eliminating arbitrage profits for German exporters. In light of these con-
siderations, the use of repatriations as a large-scale export promotion tool is ruled out.
Klug (1993) offered a very different interpretation of the repatriations, seeing them as
a policy tool to reduce Germany’s foreign debt overhang. He claimed that the secrecy of
many repatriation operations allowed for a significant spread between prices in Berlin and
international financial centers to remain independently of the amount of repatriations. If
international creditors were indeed unaware that assets they sold were being repatriated to
Germany, they would have sold at ex ante price rather than ex post prices.47 According to
Klug, Germany managed to reduce its foreign debt burden through these operations, even
if only marginally: an estimated 2% of the face value of its 1933 debt stock. This reading
of events stands in contrast with the open-market framework of Bulow and Rogoff (1988,
1991), in which the knowledge of the repatriations allows creditors to extract benefits from
the operations. It also clashes with the notion that, in order for secret repatriations to lead
to meaningful macroeconomic benefits, they need to be extremely large (Cohen and Verdier,
1995).
Some German entities did indeed engage in large repatriation operations. The largest
46For example, in this memorandum prepared in English by the German Government: FOLIO FHG/3: The
Repurchase of German Foreign Bonds, Berlin, January 26, 1934, London School of Economics and Political
Science Archive.
47In our model, as in BR, this would mean that the term Dx in (3) does not reflect anymore the true size
of outstanding debt. For more on the mechanics of secret buybacks see Cohen and Verdier (1995).
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and most notorious was orchestrated by Goebbels in 1933 to replenish the empty coffers of
the Nazi party. The operation, which relied on foreign middlemen, namely Colonel Francis
Norris and Siegfried Wreszynski, was relatively successful in achieving its primary goal by
repurchasing debt throughout Europe and possibly the US. Contrary to Klug’s claim, how-
ever, it is clear from the contemporary press that creditors knew that German debt they
sold was being repatriated. Norris and Wreszynski already enjoyed a reputation as thaw-
ers of frozen German debts and, towards the end of their operation, this was very public
information48. The secrecy of the operation simply rested in the origin of the funds used
for the operation and the final beneficiary of the scheme, and the operation was eventually
dismantled by French and British security services in May 1934. Additional evidence that
this was not a secret operation are press reports from the time claiming that the sales price
of these large repatriation operations was significantly higher than the going market price, a
fact consistent with the open-market framework of our model (equation 5) and contrary to
Klug’s secret-buyback framework. Moreover, the goal of the operation was clearly not debt
reduction49 and, large as it was, it did not have a macroeconomically relevant dimension.
The fact that the Nazi party itself could not carry out such a scheme to full fruition shows
the sheer difficulty of such secret operations.
As we further elaborate below, the existence of such an orchestrated operation can be
easily explained with our preferred interpretation of elite capture: the NSDAP was part of
the institutional machinery and it needed to be favoured as much as other important figures
of the time. We also note that, in the same period of time of the “secret” Norris-Wreszynski
operation, Finance Minister Count Schwerin von Krosigk was granted only half the amount
of foreign reserves he had privately applied for to carry out a repatriation operation: if
anything, this shows that a pecking order within the elite was present and that scarcity of
reserves was effectively binding.
Klug’s cure for overhang interpretation has other shortcomings. First, while German for-
eign debt did indeed fall sharply during the 1930s - commercial debt was more than halved,
going from 40% of GDP in 1930 to 14% in 1938 - debt repatriations were a small part of
this reduction.50 Additionally, the Lausanne Conference of 1932 had put an end to war
reparations, further and drastically reducing Germany’s foreign debt burden independently
of repatriations. Due to the reduction in external debts and the recovery of the economy,
Germany arguably stopped facing a debt overhang sometime in 1932-33. Thus, when over-
hang reduction was most needed, repatriations were scarcely used as a policy tool and they
continued long after Germany stopped facing a crushing foreign debt.51
48Fast Thawers, Time magazine, April 9, 1934. For more details, See Appendix C.2.
49Bank of England, OV34/85, Colonel Norris (Siepmann memorandum), March 11, 1936, from Klug (1993).
50Of much greater importance was the departure of the USA and Great Britain - and eventually all countries -
from the Gold Standard, which led to sizable devaluations of German debt denominated in foreign currency.
51The wider experience of the 1930s debt crisis would appear to lend support to Klug’s interpretation: “[...]
market-based debt reduction made a useful contribution to resolving the debt crisis of the 1930s by reducing
the debt overhang and eliminating marginal creditors” (Eichengreen and Portes, 1990a, page 4). However,
the authors do not mention Germany at all in their assessment, even though it carried out the largest
repatriations by far, probably because the US and the UK did not fit the definition of marginal creditors.
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Second, the government and Reichsbank managed to impose their complete control on
the repatriations only after the transfer moratorium of 1934 (Ellis, 1940a). Before that, the
Reichsbank President Hans Luther expressed disappointment for the failure of the German
authorities to curb debt repurchases more effectively, while the Ministry of the Economy,
although viewing the practice with more favor, was also eager to keep it under strict control
(James, 1985). Thus, repatriations came under the undisputed dominion of the authorities
after their usefulness as a macro policy tool to reduce the debt overhang had waned.
Third, the use of debt repatriations to reduce the foreign debt burden appears even more
unlikely for a country heading for political and economic isolationism and marching in rapid
steps towards war. Some recorded debt repatriations, principally of Austrian debt, took place
as late as 1944 (Klug, 1993). It is unclear what the value of foreign debt reduction would
have been to Germany as the 1930s progressed, and even less why the German government
would want to reduce Austria’s foreign debt in the midst of World War II.
Finally, Klug himself showed that, if the debt repatriations led to any reduction in the
market value of the German foreign debt, then this was minimal because market prices
did respond, albeit imperfectly, to these operations. A government-sanctioned decade-long
mobilization of thousands of individuals and companies, as well as billions of Reichsmarks, to
bring about a minimal reduction in the value of the foreign debt appears highly unrealistic.
5 Debt repatriations in Nazi Germany: our interpre-
tation
Having discussed the historical background and practical functioning of the repatriations,
as well as the existing literature on the episode, we now provide our own comprehensive
interpretation. We draw on the existing literature, new quantitative and qualitative evidence
and our theoretical framework to answer three key questions. 1) Why did the repatriations
start in 1931? 2) How can the behavior of German authorities be explained? 3) What
explains the price differential between German bonds traded at home and abroad? This
breakdown is, in some ways, artificial, as the answer to each of the three questions relies on
the others to provide a comprehensive and internally consistent overall picture. Nonetheless,
it is useful to organize the narrative and evidence.
5.1 Why did the debt repatriation start in 1931?
The reasons behind the start of the repatriation of German debt securities represents the
least controversial element of this historical episode. Germany’s spiralling descent into the
Great Depression described in Section 4 explains why default risk on German foreign debt
increased dramatically between 1929 and 1931. At the same time, however, German investors
perceived a widespread internal default as less likely for both political and economic reasons
(a point that will be further discussed in Section 5.2). The differing default risk led to
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a different valuation of debt securities between domestic and foreign investors.52 On one
side, this spurred foreign investors to liquidate their holdings of German debt and recoup
what they could through secondary market sales. On the other, it led German individuals
and companies to purchase German securities abroad to hold them to maturity, sell them
on or extinguish them in case they were the original issuer. As a result, large-scale debt
repatriations started as an entirely private initiative in 1931.
In the summer of the same year, however, the authorities began regulating and restrict-
ing the access of German investors to secondary markets with the introduction of exchange
controls. Bondholders, while publicly deprecating debt repatriations, held a favorable stance
in private, and interferences in the functioning of secondary markets were seen with hostil-
ity. A statement by the Council of Foreign Bondholders from 1937, for example, declared
that restraints of bond repurchases would be met with “strong and [...] effective criticism
on the ground that, by limiting the market in such bonds, it would act detrimentally to
the bondholders” (Eichengreen and Portes, 1990b). The Creditor Representatives were even
more explicit about the benefits of the repatriations declaring in 1934 that “German man-
ufacturers and German debtors are benefited, as also are the foreign creditors, the holders
of German dollar bonds, the demand for which at improved prices has been considerably
increased as a result of these transactions.”53 Contemporary commentators also understood
the detrimental effect of secondary market restrictions for creditors. Einzig (1934), for ex-
ample, identified them as a severe blow to creditors’ hope of ever seeing full repayment. This
evidence, coupled with the quantitative analysis of bond prices in Section 5.3, reinforces
our argument that secondary markets (in our model, X) can mitigate or even offset the
effects of reductions in creditors’ expectations of repayments, Rx, and are therefore of great
importance to creditors (this is the crux of the Secondary Market Hypothesis).
By restricting access to secondary markets for German citizens, the exchange controls led
to the appearance and persistence of a spread between the price of German securities traded
domestically and internationally (again, see the quantitative analysis in Section 5.3). This,
however, also increased German investors’ incentives to participate in secondary markets as
the potential for large arbitrage profits materialized.54 In fact, even with the authorities
increasing their control on the repatriations, private sector initiative remained dominant. In
52Different assessments of sovereign risk between domestic and foreign investors are not uncommon (Eaton,
Gersovitz, and Stiglitz, 1986; Claessens, Diwan, Froot, and Krugman, 1991) and are justified by the actual
differential treatment domestic and foreign creditors often receive (Broner, Didier, Erce, and Schmukler,
2013; Erce and Mallucci, 2018). In our model, this is reflected in creditor expectation Rx.
53Opening Statement of the Creditor Representatives, Berlin May 4 1934, via Klug (1993, Page 37). Inter-
estingly, the US government demonstrated its support for the continuation and extension of the exchange
controls at the London Conference of 1931. The measure was seen with favor by the Americans presumably
because it stopped the liquidation of short-term loans (at this point the Standstill Agreement covered less
than half of all short-term debts and the exchange controls were still rather porous), which might have
endangered the repayment of long-term debts, which constituted the bulk of American credit in Germany
(The Economist, July 25, 1931, p. 160, via Ellis (1940a); Auld (1934)).
54In the model, this sequence is represented by the government setting φc < 1, which then leads to a positive
capital gain term appearing in equation (9).
26
1933 1934
Month Premium, % Month Premium, %
August 122.0 January 148.5
September 124.8 February 149.5
October 125.0 March 153.0
November 120.5 April 158.5




Table 2: Premium for Foreign currency eligible for debt repatriations over regular foreign currency.
Source: U.S. Tariff Commission, Foreign Trade and Exchange Control in Germany. Report No. 150, 2d
Series. Washington 1942, via Child (1958, page 118-119).
1933, for example, a vibrant market emerged in which currency eligible for repatriations sold
at large and growing premiums over regular foreign currency exactly because of the potential
arbitrage profits of repatriations (Table 2). However, this market also had the unintended
consequence of aiding the concentration of the repatriations in the hands of a few large
banks, “which facilitated control by the authorities on which types of securities could be
repatriated” (Child, 1958, page 118-19). The market ceased to exist altogether with the
provisions of Schacht’s New Plan of August 1934, which made “eligible” foreign exchange
(i.e. foreign exchange which could be used for the repatriations) non-transferable. However,
repatriations did not stop as authorities continued to set aside and distribute substantial
amounts of foreign exchange, relative to available reserves, for such operations at least until
1939.
5.2 How can the behavior of the German authorities be explained?
The behavior of the German authorities represents the most puzzling and controversial ele-
ment of the episode. If repatriations were, indeed, a transfer of scarce resources to foreigners,
why were they not suppressed altogether? Why was coveted foreign exchange put aside for
these operations? Why would a country marching towards war and autarky after the NSDAP
came to power continue allowing repatriations well into the late 1930s?
In Section 4.2, we ruled out the use of repatriations as macroeconomic policy tool for
export stimulation and/or debt reduction. Any benefit which could be extracted from the
repatriations depended on their limited use and the resulting persistence of the price differ-
ential of German securities between home and abroad. This, combined with the impossibility
of keeping any large repatriation operations secret, meant that only a limited and selected
portion of Germany’s population and companies could stand to gain from the repatriations.
Consequently, we argue that limited and tightly controlled debt repatriations were a
useful political tool for the government. By rationing foreign exchange and controlling its
use, the German authorities were able to rule out large scale foreign debt repayment, ensure
the existence and persistence of a price differential between securities traded in domestic
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and foreign financial markets and choose who would benefit from being able to carry out
the repatriations. Additionally, the granting of foreign exchange for repatriations was used
as a tool to obtain leverage and control over individual and companies. This is why we
incorporate the idea of elite capture explicitly in our model.
We know that influential industries, individuals and companies did benefit greatly from
the repatriations (James, 1985) and that the assignment of foreign exchange, especially as
time passed and regulations became more stringent and complex, was highly bureaucratized
and arbitrary (Ellis, 1940b; James, 2020). The last Weimar governments, which preceded
the Nazi regime, were intertwined with interest groups, such as the land-owning Junkers.
Strong connections existed between the NSDAP and the industrialists who provided support
for the Hitler’s rise to power and offered the material means to fulfill his goal of rearmament
and territorial conquest.
It is also well established that favoritism by the NSDAP had economic consequences. Fer-
guson and Voth (2008) have documented this with reference to stock market performance.
As discussed in the Introduction, a counterpoint to this favoritism also existed in the form
of the dispossessing and persecution of different sections of the German population, espe-
cially Jewish Germans. The economic consequences were not limited to individuals, firms
experiencing “aryanizations” suffered in terms of stock prices, dividends and asset returns
(Huber, Lindenthal, and Waldinger, 2020). The coercive power of the state was put behind
the pursuit of these objectives, even if the economic repercussions were negative.
Granting the possibility of repurchasing foreign debt abroad was another way of favoring
supporters and strengthening alliances. Exclusion from these operations was not just a
punishment in terms of missed opportunities, but also in terms of net resources transferred
abroad, as we have shown theoretically. Rewarding some portion of society while punishing
another were so much two sides of the same coin as to even share the same tools: with the
New Plan of 1934 the emigration of German Jews was integrated in the blocked account
system by transforming the assets of the emigrants into such accounts to be converted into
foreign exchange at heavy discounts (Klug, 1993; Ritschl, 2019).
While complete records of repatriation operations have been lost, making it impossible
to reconstruct a systematic picture of the favoritism and arbitrariness of the allocation of
foreign exchange, we have several examples illustrating these mechanisms. For instance,
the company Miag Mühlenbau und Industriegesellschaft - tied to the regime because of its
involvement in rearmament - was granted foreign currency in order to buy-back some of its
own debt securities from abroad, which bore a particularly heavy interest burden (Klug,
1993). Hermann Abs - an important figure in post-WWII Germany and a Deutsche Bank
director in the 1930s - made large personal profits by purchasing German debt abroad and
selling it for higher prices in Germany (James, 2004). Two particularly remarkable examples,
which we previously mentioned, involved a member of the government and the Nazi party
itself. The Finance Minister Count Schwerin von Krosigk carried out a personal repatriation
operation in November 1933, but was only granted around half of the foreign exchange he
had initially requested (Klug, 1993). The NSDAP, in a period when it was particularly cash-
strapped (precisely between Autumn 1933 and Spring 1934), employed foreign intermediaries
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to (secretly) buy large quantities of German debt throughout Europe in order to make profits
by selling it at home, an attempt that was only partially successful.
As mentioned, the rationing of foreign exchange also served as a tool to extend the
government’s control over corporations and the private sector more generally. Desperate to
increase their foreign exchange quotas to import raw materials, subsidize exports or simply
make arbitrage profits, companies curried the favor of the Nazi regime, cooperating ever
more closely with the government to help it achieve its political and economic goals (Kobrak,
2003).55
German citizens and companies could also use debt repurchases as a tool to repatriate
assets held abroad. Capital repatriated in this way implied no net transfer of resources
abroad and, for this reason, met little resistance from the authorities. On the contrary, in
a number of cases, the government and central bank were actually actively involved in the
repatriation of offshore funds. The Reichsbank, for example, actively supported a number
of such operations (Kobrak, 2003).
One more element in the authorities’ decision-making process needs to be addressed,
namely the selective default decision. As discussed in Section 5.1 this decision underpins
the different default probability expected by domestic and foreign creditors and, as such,
is an important element of our interpretation of the whole episode. We argue that the
German government’s decision to implement a sovereign default on foreign creditors involving
both public and private debts, while enforcing domestic payments, was in line with the
objectives of the NSDAP - autarky, rearmament and territorial expansion - and that investors
understood these objectives.
Our view could be contested on the basis of the fact that, just a decade earlier, Germany
underwent a massive default on domestic rather than foreign creditors in the form of hy-
perinflation. How can the radical difference in policy response between the two episodes be
explained? Apart from the clear political differences between Germany in the early 1920s -
a newly established democracy emerging from a traumatic military defeat - and in the early
1930s - a country transitioning from an unpopular and dysfunctional democracy to a nation-
alistic totalitarian regime - we can also identify an economic rationale, which may be more
relevant for late Weimar governments. Following Erce (2012), we can frame the selective
default decision based on the following elements: 1) the source of the liquidity pressure, 2)
the health of banking system, 3) the sources of financing for the economy.
Almost half of Germany’s foreign commercial debt accumulated in the 1920s was short-
term. Towards the end of the decade, rolling over this debt became increasingly difficult,
due to the provisions of the Young Plan, the onset of the Great Depression and the deteri-
orating financial circumstances in the United States and other creditor nations. Thus, the
evidence points to a strong liquidity pressure coming from abroad. Additionally, Germany
underwent a devastating banking crisis in 1931. This made it very unpalatable for the au-
thorities to impose further pressure on a crippled financial sector in the form of an internal
default. Moreover, exchange controls were introduced precisely in order to shield the domes-
55Revolving doors between the bureaucracy and corporations were not uncommon, and government officials
familiar with the foreign exchange laws were particularly sought after.
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tic economy and the banks from capital flight. The precarious health of Germany’s banking
system might have therefore further discouraged the German authorities from not enforcing
domestic payments.
While Germany relied heavily on foreign borrowing to finance reparations payments, as
well as its public and private sectors, during the 1920s, international financial markets were
essentially shut for German borrowers starting from 1929, particularly for medium and long-
term loans.56 After the deluge in foreign borrowing of 1924-28, the German economy started
moving towards trade and financial autarky, especially after the NSDAP ascended to power
in 1933. In this context, access to foreign borrowing became of limited importance, paving
the way for external default.
To conclude our discussion of selective default, we point out that there was a limited
and implicit form of internal default in 1930s Germany. The work-creation and rearmament
programs of the National Socialist government relied on financial repression, of which the
exchange control system, with its ability to stop outward capital flows, was an important
part (Ellis, 1940a). Financial repression meant that short-term assets were transformed into
long-term ones through ad-hoc consolidation loans, interest rates and dividends were unilat-
erally reduced and kept artificially low, and the government employed substantial disguised
money printing (through the tools such as Solawechsel and Mefowechsel) to finance growing
government deficits in the second half of the 1930s (Poole, 1939).
5.3 What explains the price differential between German bonds
traded at home and abroad?
The last element of the repatriation episode we tackle is the price differential between German
bonds traded domestically and on international financial markets. We proceed in three steps.
First, we document this spread in greater breadth and detail than has been done so far by
using newly collected weekly data on German bonds prices in New York and in London
between 1930 and 1940. Second, we identify structural breaks in the spread employing an
“agnostic” methodology57 whereby we treat both the break dates58 and number of breaks as
a priori unknown, to be endogenously determined from the data. Finally, we link each break
identified to an important historical event.
56An important exception is the Young loan of 1930 (Ritschl, 2012) and the fact that, as Ritschl (2001) puts
it, “during its first two years Nazi Germany was successful in attracting fresh credit despite the continuation
of the standstill agreement and the default of 1933/34 on long term credit. One reason may have been the
discrimination against (mostly American) long term debt in favor of continuing service on (mostly British)
short-term credits (this is Schuker’s hypothesis)”.
57The nature of the macroeconomic and policy events we investigate is rather broad in scope. For this reason
we do not analyze the effect of predetermined lists of events on our series of interest. There would be an
intrinsic difficulty in determining what is really the date of the “event” (e.g. due to market expectations
or the multiple incremental changes in law enacted in a short period of time) and trying different lists of
events invalidates the standard econometric methods as it amounts to multiple testing.
58It is important to note that allowing for more than one break requires different, and more complex,
statistical procedures than in the well-known case of a single break.
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While there can never be absolute certainty about which historical events should be
associated with a certain break, we do find compelling evidence that restrictions on secondary
market access for Germans played an important role in increasing the spread. We thus find
support for one of the fundamental building blocks of our model and interpretation of the
case study.
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Figure 6: The price of Young and Dawes bonds in New York & London, and of Mortgage bonds in Berlin.
Weekly frequency. NYSE = New York Stock Exchange, LSE = London Stock Exchange. Source: New York,
The Annalist (1930-1940); London, The Financial Times (1929-1932) for 1929-32 and Brown and Burdekin
(2002) for the rest of the period; Berlin, Global Financial Data (2020).
Figure 6 presents the weekly data for the Dawes and Young bonds traded on the New
York and London Stock Exchanges as well as quotations of German Mortgage bonds on
the Berlin Stock Exchange. The sample begins in December 1929 (for the Young series it
starts in June 1930 in New York and in September 1930 in London) and ends in June 1940.
The data was manually collected from the The Annalist (1930-1940) for New York and the
The Financial Times (1929-1932) for London until the end of 1932, when we splice it with
data from Brown and Burdekin (2002). The Berlin Mortgage bond data comes from Global
Financial Data (2020). Two data issues are immediately apparent: i) the series for Berlin is
incomplete, as the Stock Exchange was closed from July 1931 to April 1932; ii) in order to
work with weekly data, we take the public bonds for which data at this frequency is available,
namely Mortgage bonds in Berlin and Young and Dawes bonds in New York and London,
as representative of German public bonds and as directly comparable to each other.
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To deal with the first issue, we reconstruct the missing data in the bonds traded in Berlin
assuming four different scenarios, all but one involving an eight-week slump in prices corre-
lated to the dynamics of the US stock market. Three of the four scenarios differ in the timing
of the start of the slump (ranging from July to August 1931), whereas the dynamics for the
rest of the missing subsample are all based on interpolated monthly data of representative
German fixed interest securities from the League of Nations Statistical Yearbook 1932-33.
The fourth reconstructed series consists in a linear interpolation for the whole missing sub-
sample. We use these four reconstructed Berlin bond series to obtain 16 different spreads
series, four for each foreign-traded bond series we study (Dawes and Young) and for each
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Figure 7: The price of German bonds in different financial markets.
Monthly frequency. Source: Institut für Konjunkturforschung (1933, 1936).
Reassurance that the second issue - i.e. the representativeness of the bonds and their
comparability to each other - is not a problem for our analysis is provided by Figure 7. This
59See appendix B.4 for more details.
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reports monthly price data for a wide range of bond types and locations. The lower panel
of the figure shows that the monthly prices of different types of bonds traded in Berlin were
highly correlated with each other. This applies to both public and private bonds, with a
correlation of bond type pairs of between 0.82 and 0.98. The figure also illustrates that
Young and Dawes bonds traded in New York and London were representative of a broad
range of German bonds types traded abroad (panel a and b). In New York, for example,
the correlation between pairs of bond types ranged between 0.89 and 0.99. The correlation
between German bonds traded in New York, London, Paris, Zurich and Amsterdam was also
very high: 0.78 at the lowest and 0.98 at the highest.60
The high correlation across bond types and locations has a simple historical explanation:
for foreign investors in this period, changes in sovereign risk dominated issues related to
specific bond types. Although some differences existed in the treatment of creditors based
on nationality - with Brits receiving a more favorable treatment than Americans on average
(Eichengreen and Portes, 1988a) - macro developments were similar for all foreign credi-
tors. In fact, while the German government was very keen in claiming a difference between
“political” and other debts, in practice the treatment of different categories of debtors was
not significantly different (Guinnane, 2004). Moreover, the decision to repay foreign debts,
whether public or private, eventually rested with German authorities, making all German
foreign debt de facto sovereign. This was also confirmed ex-post by the London Debt Agree-
ment of 1953, in which both private and public German debts from the interwar period
were discussed and negotiated jointly. Similarly, in Berlin, common macro developments
dominated the evolution of bond prices.
A simple visual inspection of the data in Figures 6 and 7 allows one to conclude that the
prices of German bonds traded in Berlin followed a very different path compared to similar
bonds traded abroad. First of all, their price recovered much faster after the crash of 1931.
Secondly, their co-movement with bonds traded abroad broke down in the first half of 1934,
with bonds in Berlin trading at stable prices close to face value and internationally-traded
bonds exhibiting volatile and decreasing prices.
We show that these developments are also picked up by statistical tools. We follow the
dynamic optimization procedure of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003), which estimates the break
dates of a univariate process for a given number of breaks, after having tested for the optimal
number of breaks with a battery of different tests. We assume an autoregressive process61 of
60The privileged status of Young and Dawes loans compared to other foreign loans, which gave them a
certain degree of seniority over other debts at least until 1933 (Clement, 2004), is also not problematic for
our analysis. This is because it shielded these bonds from fluctuations due to temporary shifts in economic
conditions, policy, and creditor expectations, making the structural breaks we find more reliable.
61The choice of a first-order autoregressive model permits us to use a reasonably flexible, yet easily tractable
model. It’s not possible to assume a unit root process as we are potentially considering multiple breaks
and even sophisticated tests found in the literature cannot be applied in this case (e.g. Kejriwal, Perron,
and Zhou (2013)). The appropriate test would be one which tests the null of a unit root with multiple
breaks against the alternative of a stationary process with multiple breaks but, to our knowledge, such a
test exists only for cases with up to two breaks (Lee and Strazicich, 2003) and not for an arbitrary number
of breaks. We could have therefore simply assumed stationarity of the series under each regime, but since
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the first order, in which the constant term and the autoregressive coefficients of the model
are both subject to structural breaks. This means that we allow for breaks both in the
level and the persistence of the process. We also control for local market conditions with an
exogenous regressor that reflects the evolution of the respective stock market. The interested
reader can refer to appendix B for technical details.
Besides break dates, we also provide asymmetric 90% confidence intervals around the
breaks, which allow us to identify historical events within a reasonable time interval rather
than a single date. This is particularly useful in periods where, as will be discussed, multiple
policy interventions of the same nature took place in a short period of time.
5.3.2 Results
Across all 16 spread series, there is support for a number of break dates varying between
four and seven. We present results when allowing for the highest number of breaks reason-
ably supported by each model. Our estimation of the structural breaks yields remarkably
consistent results across different locations - London and New York - bond types - Young
and Dawes - and assumptions regarding the evolution of the Berlin bond prices during the
closure of the stock exchange. Full results for each spread series, including break dates and
confidence intervals, are reported in Appendix B.2. The results are further robust to different
specifications of the models,62 to the use of a different stock index for New York, as well as
the series of interest being the price level of the Dawes and Young bonds abroad instead of
the spread.
We summarize the key findings of the analysis in Table 3. For each identified break, the
table shows the earliest and latest point estimate of the break date across all 16 models.
More precisely, because we use end-of-week data, we provide the date of the Saturday of
the first week of the new regime following a structural break. The table also reports the
historical event associated with each break, as well as whether this led to a higher or lower
spread.
Critical junctures in Germany’s history in this period appear as structural breaks. For
example, we clearly identify the impact of the Lausanne Conference of 1932, the reinstate-
ment of Hjalmar Schacht as president of the Reichsbank and the start of World War II in
1939. That we are able to pick up these episodes, which had clear bearing on the repayment
probability of foreign creditors, is reassuring and lends credibility to our empirical strategy.
However, most importantly for our purposes, the majority of the breaks are associated with
events featuring the introduction and strengthening of exchange controls. Thus, many of
the events we find to be important for the evolution of the spread are set apart from other
important economic and political landmarks in Germany’s default by the fact that the access
of German citizens and companies to secondary markets for debt abroad was restricted. This
is consistent with secondary market hypothesis and, thus, also with our theoretical approach.
we are interested in the short sample properties of each regime it would most likely be an assumption of no
consequence.
62See appendix B.3 for details.
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Break Event Earliest and latest break week Effect on
# among all models the spread
1 Introduction of exchange controls 11 April 1931 - 10 October 1931 ↑
2 Cancellation of reparations (Lausanne Conference) 11 June 1932 ↓
3 Reinstitution of Schacht as Reichsbank president 11 February 1933 - 4 March 1933 ↑
4 Transfer moratorium and strengthening of exchange controls 3 March 1934 - 5 May 1934 ↑
5 Further strengthening of exchange controls 14 July 1937 - 4 September 1937 ↑
6 New foreign exchange controls announced and implemented 1 October 1938 - 31 December 1938 ↑
7 Germany invades Poland and World War II begins 26 August 1939 - 2 September 1939 ↑
Table 3: Historical events corresponding to the break dates in the German bonds spread series.
For full results, including confidence intervals for each of the breaks, see Appendix B.2.
The first break we find corresponds to the start of the German debt crisis and of exchange
controls system in the summer of 1931. This break date is not estimated as consistently across
different models as the other breaks for two main reasons.
First, the break corresponds to the period in which the German stock exchange was closed
and, therefore, the period in which we had to reconstruct the spread between the prices of
the bonds based on a variety of probable scenarios. This reduces the likelihood of identifying
a clear break in this period (see Appendix B.4). Reassuringly, however, we find very similar
break dates when we perform our analysis just on the foreign debt price levels rather than
the spread, indicating that the reconstruction of the data is not driving the results. This
is also in line with our interpretation and theoretical framework, which indicates that most
of the action should come from changes in the expected probability of repayment of foreign
creditors when affected by a change in the access to secondary markets by the debtors.
Second, although in retrospect we can clearly identify the date in which Germany’s
exchange control system came into being, at the time a large degree of uncertainty existed
on the nature of the controls. The measure was widely seen as temporary, and provisions
to make the controls effective were introduced only gradually as Germany’s crisis deepened
(Ellis, 1940a), helping to explain why different models pick up different weeks for the start of
this new regime. Nonetheless, our statistical procedure clearly identifies a structural break in
this crucial period, unambiguously indicating a worsening of the prospects of repayment for
foreign creditors in connection with the first restrictions on trading on secondary markets.
While the drop in the price of German bonds also clearly reflects the general disarray of
the German and world economy, we argue that exchange controls were particularly problem-
atic for holders of German securities abroad, and that this explains the structural break we
find. Debt repatriations had given the opportunity to foreign investors to dispose of assets
whose default risk had increased. Facing a lower probability of default or the possibility of
posting profits thanks to prices well below face-value, German investors and companies were
willing counterparts in these transactions. The introduction and tightening of the exchange
controls, however, made these transactions increasingly difficult.
The second break we identify is the only one connected with a decrease, rather than an
increase of the spread. This is not surprising since the break is clearly linked to the Lausanne
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Conference of June-July 1932, which, de facto, put an end to war reparation payments, thus
raising the expected value of the remaining serviced debts, including Dawes and Young
bonds.
We identify a further downward break in February/March 1933, in correspondence with
the reinstatement of Hjalmar Schacht as head of the Reichsbank. Schacht was a complex
figure: at the same time a staunch opponent of reparations - he also believed the Young
loan to have been imposed on Germany immorally (Schacht, 1934; Clement, 2004) - and a
friendly figure in international financial circles. His actions after 1933, despite some window-
dressing, were unambiguously bad news for foreign investors, however, and his hostility to
foreign creditors even more explicit than that of his predecessor. Even before the transfer
moratorium and the consolidation of exchange controls as a totalitarian tool of control in
1934, he took important steps that reduced the foreign exchange available for debt repa-
triations and foreign debt service. In particular, his first act as new Reichsbank president
was the unilateral decision to repay a large loan his predecessor had obtained from foreign
central banks, which had represented a much-needed foreign exchange reserve buffer for the
Reichsbank and a guarantee of at least partial service of commercial debts.
The complete transfer moratorium and the introduction of even tougher exchange controls
in 1934 are connected to a further collapse in the bond spread and to the fourth identified
break. This legislation - announced after the so-called Transfer Conference of April-May and
enforced from July 1934 - made debt repurchases extremely difficult because of the complete
monopoly of the Reichsbank over foreign exchange operations. As shown in Table 1, foreign
debt repatriations had grown in volume over time since their start in 1931, peaking at over
a billion Reichsmarks in 1933. After the policy tightening of 1934, however, they fell sharply
and were kept under strict control for the rest of the decade.
As a result, there was enormous increase in the spread between German securities traded
in Berlin and abroad, which could not be arbitraged away through debt repatriations. At
the same time, for those who could engage in the practice, the arbitrage profits stemming
from debt repatriations were higher than ever. This is clearly reflected in the price premium
of foreign exchange that could be used for debt repatriations over standard foreign exchange,
which grew massively after May 1934 and peaked in August 1934, before the market was
suppressed (Table 2).
We are also able to pick up two further tightenings of exchange controls. The first took
place in May-September 1937,63 while the second is connected to the announcement and
implementation of the foreign exchange law in November-December 193864.
The last break we pick up is not an episode of financial repression or an event directly
connected to Germany’s foreign debt. Its importance for the probability of repayment of
foreign debt holders, however, is difficult to dispute. This is the outbreak of World War
II, represented by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the German invasion of Poland on
63More precisely: on May 27, see Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1937, Teil I, Nr. 65, p. 600-601;
and on September 16, see Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1937, Teil I, Nr. 105, p. 1018-19.
64November 8: Anträge auf Zuteilung von Devisen. December 12: Bekanntmachung des Gesetzes über die
Devisenbewirtschaftung. Source: Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt Jahrgang 1938, Teil I, Nr. 211, p. 1733-48.
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September 1st, 1939.
A remarkable aspect of our results is that we find consistent break dates for both London
and New York, despite the different treatment creditors of the two countries received from
Germany. This was generally more favorable for British creditors (Eichengreen and Portes,
1988a,b), mainly because the British government and the Corporation of Foreign Bondhold-
ers were active and successful in their lobbying on behalf of British investors (Auld, 1934).
The US government, instead, had a generally laissez-faire attitude, and the American equiva-
lent of the Corporation - the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council - was a recently-created
institution (founded in 1933), as opposed to an experienced British counterpart active since
1868.
An example of differential treatment closely related to our structural break in 1934 is the
Anglo-German Transfer Agreement of July 1934. With this, Germany reprised the service
of the Dawes and Young loans held by British investors in full , while only offering partial
payments to other creditors (Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, 1934). Yet, we identify
a break in both new York and London. Restrictions on secondary market trading, instead,
applied equally to all classes of creditors, leading us to conclude that these, rather than
simply a change in the service of the loans, were the main driver of the downward revision
of the price of German bonds both in London and New York.
Our results are also notable for what we do not find. The service of German foreign debt
was modified - usually downwards - a number of times. However, we detect no breaks in
correspondence to such events. In particular, the Law on Payments Abroad of May 1933,
which marked the start of Germany’s soon-to-be-complete default on its foreign debt, is
not associated with a break in our analysis. Although the moratorium on foreign payments
implemented in May 1933 did not initially affect the Dawes bonds and touched only the
amortization of the Young bonds (Toniolo, 2005, pages 153-57), one would expect such an
event to affect the expected probability of repayment for all foreign investors.65 Moreover,
the Young and Dawes bonds were also directly impacted by the events of May 1933, given
that the German government unilaterally revoked the Gold Clause, which meant that the
Dawes and Young bonds started being serviced in nominal rather than in the original gold
value basis.
This finding can be easily rationalized through the lenses of our model: price Px will
not be affected by a reduction in the nominal value of the promised repayment if φc is low
enough such that the price already incorporates the loss.66
To sum up, the breaks we find correspond to either key historical events or episodes related
specifically to Germany’s foreign debt, usually accompanied by partial or total defaults or
restructurings. The distinctive features of these latter episodes, compared to those for which
65Prices recovered from mid-1933 until January 1934, probably due to a group of countries (Netherlands,
Switzerland and briefly the UK) offering to raise their import quota of German goods in return for investor
protection (Clement, 2004). This would have obviously had a positive impact on German foreign currency
reserves and thus on the servicing of its foreign debt.
66As an example: if outstanding debt is 100 and φc is such that available resources for repayment are 70
(Px = 0.7), then if the debtor announces that it will only consider the face value of its debt to be 90 this
will not move the price as available resources to creditors remain 70 while nominal debt is still 100.
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we do not find structural breaks, was the tightening of foreign exchange controls. In line
with our model, the accumulated evidence and our reading of the history, we conclude
that exchange controls, by limiting the access of Germans to secondary markets, closed the
“backdoor” channel through which the effects of limited foreign debt services and increased
default probability for foreign debt holders could be offset. In fact, in the face of a purely
external default such as the one we observe, debt repatriation would have represented a
natural way for creditors to dismiss unwanted assets and for German citizens to profit on
their higher probability of repayment.
6 Conclusion
This paper has looked back in history for insights on debt crises and the effects of capital
controls. It found that political economy elements, such as internal redistribution considera-
tions due to elite capture, play a relevant economic role. More precisely, we have studied the
large repatriations of foreign debt carried out by Germans throughout the 1930s, historically
one of the largest episodes of its kind. Previous studies of the episode could not explain all
relevant known aspects of the episode, both at the micro and macro level. We show that the
main features of the repatriations can be explained through the lenses of modern macroeco-
nomic theory, in particular with a model that merges the main intuitions of Broner, Martin,
and Ventura (2010) - on the role of secondary markets in sovereign risk - and Bulow and
Rogoff (1991) - on the sub-optimality of debt buybacks - and extends them to allow for elite
capture.
We argue that, despite the scarcity of foreign reserves, debt repatriations were not sup-
pressed altogether once authorities stepped in to curb capital flight because they allowed
the pursuit of specific micro-objectives. In fact, key companies, influential individuals, and
the Nazi Party itself profited from these operations in the form of large capital gains, hid-
den export subsidies, or reduction of private debt exposure. At the same time, their use as
a systematic macro-tool was ruled out as it would have led to excessive debt repayments,
capital flight, depletion of official reserves, and welfare losses for the German economy as a
whole, and this was known to the authorities.
Our interpretation is supported by published and unpublished historical documents and
archival sources, as well as quantitative analysis of weekly spreads of German bonds in New
York, London and Berlin. The spread analysis, in particular, reveals that government inter-
ventions and other events which hampered the efficiency of secondary markets had sharply
negative effects on the price of German bonds abroad, while their prices were unaffected at
home. This finding offers support for a key role of secondary markets in historical as well
as in recent debt crises, such as the European one of the 2010s (Broner, Erce, Martin, and
Ventura, 2014).
Our research can be extended by further investigating the economic and political mech-
anisms that lead to the emergence of elites, as well as their feedback effect on the economy
in the context of cross-border transactions. We have no reason to believe that the relevance
of our findings and theoretical approach is limited to 1930s Germany: the mechanism we
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analyzed could be applied to other settings, particularly to countries prone to elite capture.
This opens the way for further empirical investigations of similar episodes.
On the theoretical side, research stemming from the Lucas Paradox (Lucas, 1990) shows a
link between the quality of institutions and capital flows, while the literature on relationship-
based capitalism points to a relation between capital controls and quality of institutions.
Thus, closing the circle some important questions remain open: Do lower quality institu-
tions rely more on capital controls? Do capital controls, in turn, have a feedback effect on
institutions? How does this affect the direction, size and impact of cross-border capital flows
beyond the direct effects of capital controls?
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A.1 An increase in ωs always reduces X
∗
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Thus an increase in ωs always reduces X
∗.
A.2 The effect of an increase in α and its interaction with ωs




























The sign of eq. (13) will depend crucially on the sign of (2ωs − 1).
• When ωs ≤ 0.5, the condition is always positive and an increase in α increases X
∗,
unless the non-negativity condition on X = 0 is binding.
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• When ωs = 1, the first additive term goes to zero and only the additional marginal
costs are left. In this case, an increase in α always decreases X∗. Remember that when
α = 0.5 then X∗ = 0, so X∗ = 0 holds for any value of α.
• When 0.5 < ωs < 1, the sign of the effect of an increase in α on X
∗ will depend on
the balance between the additional marginal benefits and costs, therefore on the actual
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values of the structural parameters. One can see that lower additional marginal costs
are associated with higher values of β and φc (the additional domestic repayments are
not much larger than what foreigners would get) and lower values of γ (less income
forfeited through the public good). The additional marginal gains, on the other hand,
are higher with higher values of β and φc.
A.3 The role of β and γ
The marginal effects of both β and γ have been already discussed in the main text. In Figure
8 we show the joint effect on X∗ of β and γ, for representative given values of φc, α, and ωs,
and fixing D0 = 100.
Figure 8: Optimal X∗ on the vertical axis. φc was fixed at 0.8, ωs = 0.1, and α = 0.7.
A.4 Alternative enforcement technology σ
Here we consider two alternative specifications67 for σ:
σb[X|Yp, φc] = β(φcYp −max{0, X − (1− φc)Yp}) (15a)
σc[X|Yp, φc] = βmax{0, φcYp −X} (15b)
Function σb (15a) covers the case where X originates first from domestic resources
shielded by capital controls (which amount to (1 − φc)Yp) and only when, and if, these
67The function could be linear or nonlinear: Bulow and Rogoff (1991) provide more necessary conditions for
the nonlinear case.. We do not include an intercept for tractability, which would represent debt enforcement
independent of capital controls e.g. military occupation.
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are exhausted by X, funds are taken from resources available to creditors through σ. We
can view this case as one more favorable to creditors relative to the reference one because,
for low levels of X, some resources normally already defaulted upon will be transferred to
creditors without a corresponding decline in expected repayments. Only when enough X has
been used for repatriations, given φc, will resources available to creditors begin to decline,
thus reducing σb. This implies no correlation between X and σb for low levels of X and a
negative correlation for higher levels.
In contrast to the previous case, σc (15b) can be viewed as one more favorable to debtors,
where X is financed first with resources that would have otherwise been seized by creditors,
implying a negative correlation between X and σb for low levels of X and no correlation for
higher values.68
We now show that the main results of the model presented in section 5 hold also under
a different enforcement technology σ. The two graphs in Figure 9 are constructed in exactly
the same way as Figure 3, except that σb and σc (equations 15a and 15b) are substituted in
each case for σa (equation 7). Under all three scenarios, when α = 0.5 then X
∗ = 0, and
X∗ > 0 only if α > 0.5. As argued in section 5, σb is the technology that, among the three
proposed, discourages repatriations the most. In fact, when the boxplot in Figure 3 (in the
main text) is compared with the boxplot in Figure 9a it can be noted that, as expected, the
distribution of X∗ has more mass towards zero in the case of σb, but nonetheless it allows
for positive X∗ under some parameter combinations when α > 0.5. On the other hand, the
model under σc - the technology that most encourages repatriations - has less mass of X
∗
on the zero outcome, but also in this case when α = 0.5, then X∗ = 0.
A.5 Comparison with related models
Comparing our model to the closest literature allows us to highlight some interesting features
and novelties of our approach. We generalize BR’s main result over another dimension of
policy making by means of simple microfoundations, thus separating individual and collective
interests. The main economic force at play is still one that leads to X∗ = 0, and for the same
reason as in BR. However, in our case, that force can be countered by an unequal government
preference for the welfare of different groups of citizens, which pushes the government to
adopt a policy X∗ > 0 because detrimental effects are borne by all citizens (through equation
8 and decreased public good provision), while the benefits are only enjoyed by the preferred
group.69
As previously discussed, direct relation with the results of BR is evident when considering
68This is not the only way to see that this case is favored by debtors: in the context of private commercial
debt traded domestically (i.e. creditors and debtors share the same jurisdiction, so β = 1 representing
perfect enforcement of contracts) this corresponds to corporate debt buybacks, where an issuer buys back
its own debt. Buybacks are therefore always beneficial because, lacking better investment opportunities, in
exchange for less than a dollar, they allow retiring a dollar’s worth of collateral that could be seized in the
event of default. See Bulow and Rogoff (1988) for details and limitations of this case.
69BR note that by relaxing some conditions in their model they can numerically obtain a positive optimal X.
However, they find that this holds only for a range of structural parameters values they deem unrealistic.
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(a) σb (b) σc
Figure 9: Boxplot of the distribution of X∗ for different values of α, under σb and σc.
For each value of α, the model is solved for all combinations of 15 values for each of the param-
eters β, γ, ωs, φc, for a total of 50625 grid points for each value of α. The 15 values are:
(0.025, 0.05, 0.10, 0.125, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.35, 0.45, 0.55, 0.65, 0.75, 0.85, 0.95, 0.975). Horizontal axis not to
scale.
a higher ωs (the supporters group size), everything else equal: the extreme case of ωs = 1
(all citizens are supporters) is exactly the case of BR, where collective and group interests
match perfectly and therefore X∗ = 0. If an individual within the group could deviate from
the government decision, then she would make capital gains at the expense of all others: the
government solves exactly this coordination problem. In general, when X∗ > 0, the higher
the number of citizens allowed to engage in repatriations, the lower X∗ becomes, until it
quickly reaches zero again; note that ωs need not necessarily reach 1 for X
∗ = 0. This
happens because, as ωs increases, the collective detrimental effects of repatriations in the
form of higher domestic repayments in ρ are gradually internalized by more supporters and
capital gains cannot compensate for this (eq. 11). Conversely, decreasing ωs when X
∗ > 0
will lead to a higher X∗. Note that these outcomes in the spirit of BR can be observed on
the supply side of X, i.e. the government’s choice of X that maximizes the social welfare
function.
A comparison with BMV must start by highlighting one key difference: in the language
of our model, BMV assume that the government can control β and nothing else, and that
trade on secondary markets is purely driven by unregulated private incentives.70 Similarly
to BMV, in our model agents also have private incentives to repatriate but, as in BR, the
government controls X, thereby limiting private demand for it.
In BMV, when debt is in foreign hands the government will of course choose β = 0
to strategically default on foreigners, the socially preferable outcome. However, smoothly
functioning secondary markets allow for a full circumvention of that policy as citizens can
access any level of X they can afford to repatriate debt for their own profit. In equilibrium
all debt is therefore repatriated (i.e. Dx = 0)
71 and no strategic default is possible when
70To fully compare our model to BMV one must assume ωs = 1 and no government spending (1) (or γ = 0).
71To see this, note that when β = 0, eq.(5) becomes Px = X/D0, which then simplifies in (3) to get Dx = 0.
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φc = 1. In contrast with BMV, we allow Rx to be non-zero and its relation with X defined
in σ: this permits partial repatriations (Dx > 0).
It is in this comparison with BMV that the crucial role played by secondary markets
stands out the most. In fact, given β and φc, in our model the values of the different σ are
generally not the same. Since different specifications of σ represent alternative implementa-
tions of capital controls, this shows that how secondary markets are impaired matters and
it should be explicitly modeled, separately from other sources of debtor-creditor interaction.
Other papers, notably Krugman (1988) and Froot (1989), also reach the conclusion that
sovereign buybacks can be socially beneficial under specific conditions. While noting that
their frameworks are very different from ours, they depart most notably by assuming the
specific case of β = 1, an assumption closer to a case of corporate buyback (see footnote 68).
This highlights the importance of studying more general frameworks for debt repatriations,
especially when it concerns the debtor-creditor interaction as in function σ.
An issue featured prominently in most models mentioned in this section is that of debt
overhang. We do not address it directly, but overhang can be included by adding two small
extensions to the model. First, an alternative use for the government endowment not used for
repatriations, representing the efficient domestic allocation of resources potentially affected
by foreign debt. Second, the resources that creditors can seize (Yp) should depend on this
allocation of resources. However, since our model generalizes BR by using similar model
mechanics of international markets, and because the channel of debt overhang reduction
increases resource allocation efficiency, we believe it would lead to a higher or at most
unchanged X∗, which would only strengthen our result.
B Empirical Methodology
The dynamic optimization procedure of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) finds the structural
breaks dates (T1, ..., Tm) of a partial structural change model such that:





[yt − α̂j[Tj ] − ρ̂j[Tj ]yt−1 − β̂[Tj ]zt] (16)
where yt is our series on interest, either one of the reconstructed series of the spread or
the price level of the Dawes and Young bonds traded in New York and London; zt is the
exogenous control for local market performance (as explained in the main text), and the
hat denotes sample estimates. There are m + 1 regimes j = 1, ...,m + 1 (with T0 = 0 and
Tm+1 = T ), wherem is the number of breaks and the subscript [Tj] represents the dependence
of parameter estimates on the date of the breaks.
BMV propose a variation of their model (Example 9, page 1544) that allows for what can be interpreted
as debt repatriations under impaired secondary markets. However, also in that case all debt is repatriated.
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B.1 Practical implementation
We implement this algorithm using a Matlab “translation” of the original GAUSS code
of Bai and Perron (2003) downloaded from the website of Yohei Yamamoto, Hitotsubashi
University. We subsequently modified the code (see comments in the file brcode.m for more
details). We set the trimming value h as suggested by Bai and Perron (2003), except in some
cases concerning Young bonds, where we augment the value of h by 10-15%. This is done
because our series for Young bonds in London has 36 observation less at the beginning of
the sample than the London Dawes bonds, and the series in New York has 24 observations
less than the New York Dawes bonds series. This not only means that the two Young series
start in a period of higher volatility but also that the beginning of the sample is very close
to the reconstructed subsample. We do not believe that augmenting h, however minimally,
could lead to a “false” break date being selected in that first part of the sample, as the result
of Chong (1995) applies in this case.
The confidence intervals are calculated allowing for the moment matrix of the data to
vary across the identified regimes. For each of the bonds the reported confidence intervals
are those estimated from the model with most breaks among the reported ones. For a break
that is present both in a model with M and M+1 breaks its confidence interval is in practice
not affected, if so only marginally, when estimated from the model with M+1 breaks.
B.2 Full structural breaks results




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Other
LSE Dawes M1
26 Sept 1931 11 June 1932 4 March 1933 10 Mar 1934 31 Dec 1938 2 Sep 1939
29/8/31-28/11/31 9/4/32-18/6/32 25/2/33-1/4/33 24/2/34-7/4/34 30/7/38-7/1/39 2/9/39-2/9/39
LSE Dawes M2
11 Apr 1931 11 June 1932 4 March 1933 10 Mar 1934 31 Dec 1938 2 Sep 1939
21/06/30-25/07/31 26/03/32-25/06/32 25/2/33-1/4/33 24/2/34-21/4/34 27/8/38-7/1/39 2/9/39-2/9/39
LSE Dawes M3
1 Aug 1931 11 June 1932 4 March 1933 10 Mar 1934 31 Dec 1938 2 Sep 1939
27/6/31-26/9/31 16/04/32-18/06/32 25/2/33-1/4/33 24/2/34-14/4/34 13/8/38-7/1/39 2/9/39-2/9/39
LSE Dawes M4
26 Sep 1931 11 June 1932 4 March 1933 10 Mar 1934 31 Dec 1938 2 Sep 1939
27/6/31-28/11/31 2/4/32-18/6/32 25/2/33-1/4/33 24/2/34-14/4/34 13/8/38-7/1/39 2/9/39-2/9/39
LSE Young M1
10 Oct 1931 11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 3 Mar 1934 31 Dec 1938 2 Sep 1939
1/8/31-26/12/31 28/5/32-11/6/32 11/2/33-18/02/33 17/2/34-31/3/34 9/7/38-7/1/39 26/8/39-2/9/39
LSE Young M2
11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 10 Mar 1934 14 Aug 1937 26 Nov 1938 2 Sep 1939 23 Mar 1935
28/5/32-11/06/32 11/02/33-18/02/33 3/2/34-7/4/34 23/1/37-2/10/37 19/11/38-14/1/39 12/8/39-2/9/39 24/11/34-20/07/35
LSE Young M3
26 Sep 1931 11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 3 Mar 1934 31 Dec 1938 2 Sep 1939
27/06/31-14/11/31 04/06/32-18/06/32 11/2/33-18/2/33 17/2/34-21/4/34 20/8/38-7/1/39 26/8/39-2/9/39
LSE Young M4
10 Oct 1931 11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 3 Mar 1934 31 Dec 1938 2 Sep 1939
05/09/31-07/11/31 04/06/32-11/06/32 11/2/33-18/2/33 17/2/34-14/4/34 13/8/38-7/1/39 26/8/39-2/9/39
NYSE Dawes M1
11 Jul 1931 11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 5 May 1934 4 Sep 1937 1 Oct 1938 26 Aug 1939
18/04/31-18/07/31 28/05/32-11/06/32 4/02/33-4/03/33 28/4/34-2/6/34 30/1/37-4/9/37 24/9/38-18/2/39 4/3/39-9/9/39
NYSE Dawes M2
5 Sep 1931 11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 5 May 1934 4 Sep 1937 1 Oct 1938 26 Aug 1939
11/07/31-26/09/31 14/05/32-25/06/32 4/02/33-4/03/33 28/4/34-9/6/34 23/1/37-4/9/37 24/09/38-11/2/39 18/3/39-9/9/39
NYSE Dawes M3
11 July 1931 11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 5 May 1934 4 Sep 1937 1 Oct 1938 26 Aug 1939*
18/04/31-18/07/31 28/05/32-18/06/32 04/02/33-04/03/33 28/4/34-9/6/34 16/1/37-4/9/37 1/10/38-11/2/39
NYSE Dawes M4
3 Oct 1931 11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 5 May 1934 4 Sep 1937 1 Oct 1938 26 Aug 1939
12/9/31-17/10/31 21/05/32-18/06/32 4/2/33-4/3/33 28/4/34-2/6/34 23/1/37-4/9/37 24/9/38-18/2/39 4/3/39-9/9/39
NYSE Young M1
4 Jul 1931 11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 3 March 1934 4 Sep 1937 26 Nov 1938 26 Aug 1939
23/5/31-18/7/31 28/5/32-11/6/32 4/2/33-25/2/33 24/2/34-28/4/34 21/11/36-4/9/37 5/11/38-21/1/39 22/7/39-16/9/39
NYSE Young M2
11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 3 March 1934 17 Apr 1937 26 Nov 1938 26 Aug 1939 9 Nov 1935
28/5/32-18/6/32 11/2/33-18/2/33 24/2/34-21/4/34 20/2/37-17/7/37 5/11/38-31/12/38 5/8/39-23/9/39 12/10/35-4/1/36
NYSE Young M3
4 Jul 1931 11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 3 March 1934 4 Sep 1937 26 Nov 1938 26 Aug 1939
2/5/31-11/7/31 4/6/32-18/6/32 11/2/33-25/2/33 24/2/34-28/4/34 14/11/36-11/9/37 5/11/38-14/1/39 29/7/39-16/9/39
NYSE Young M4
10 Oct 1931 11 June 1932 11 Feb 1933 3 March 1934 4 Sep 1937 26 Nov 1938 26 Aug 1939*
12/9/31-17/10/31 4/6/32-11/6/32 11/2/33-25/2/33 24/2/34-5/5/34 24/10/36-11/9/37 19/11/38-13/5/39
Table 4: Breaks and corresponding confidence intervals for the various spread series of German bonds between Berlin, London and New York.
LSE= London Stock Exchange, NYSE= New York Stock Exchange. *only with highest number of breaks supported by the SupF test.
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B.3 Robusteness checks
Our results are robust to allowing for different forms of heteroskedasticity across regimes of
the moment matrix of the regressors and of the variance of the residuals, as available in the
code and documented in Bai and Perron (2003). We also use a different control variable for
New York, specifically a subindex of 40 industrial bonds (included in the dataset). Another
robustness check consists of running the analysis on the price level of the bonds instead of
the spread . Moreover, for all models we repeat the analysis with the dependent variable y
as the spread series (the results of which are reported in the main text), the foreign (NY or
London) price level, or the log-level of the foreign price, always controlling for the level of
the stock index.
B.4 Reconstructed spread series
Figure 10: Four reconstructed spreads series of Dawes and Young bond prices traded in New York with
respect to mortgage bonds prices traded in Berlin. Weekly frequency. See main text for sources.
The Berlin Stock Exchange was closed between July 1931 and April 1932. We reconstruct
the missing values under different scenarios, all but one involving an eight-week slump in
prices correlated to the dynamics of the US stock market (data from Global Financial Data).
The scenarios differ in the timing of the slump (ranging from mid-July to August until
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October-November 1931), whereas one consists in a linear interpolation for the whole missing
subsample. For the three scenarios where we reconstruct a crash we use an underlying trend
for the whole subsample, upon which we “add” the crash. The trend is constructed from the
League of Nations Statistical Yearbook 1932-33, where we find monthly yields for a sample of
representative German fixed interest securities for the period when the Berlin Stock exchange
was closed. We take the implied monthly growth rate of these representative securities and
linearly interpolate them to get weekly figures.
We then use these reconstructed series for the Berlin mortgage bonds to get four different
spreads series for the Dawes and Young bonds respectively, in NY and in London, for a total
of sixteen spread series, all available in the data files. Figure 10 shows the eight reconstructed
spread series for New York: with respect to Young and Dawes bonds alike, the series obviously
overlap for the whole sample, except for the reconstructed subsample. Similarly, data for
the London series can be found in the Matlab data files.
C Further historical background
C.1 The composition of German debt in 1931
Data collected from archival sources provides further insights into the context in which the
German debt repatriations took place. In particular, we have a snapshot of the nature and
composition of German foreign commercial debts at the end of November 1931, in the early
stages of repatriations. As mentioned in the text, the USA was Germany’s principal creditor
and industry the principal debtor. Although America’s lending to Germany has been often
highlighted as exceptional and at least partially politically motivated - Schuker (1988) called
it “American reparations to Germany” - the USA was the principal lender of the 1920s for
a good number of countries. Accominotti and Eichengreen (2016) have recently shown that
around 66% of all European bond issues between 1924 and 1928 took place in New York.
England, the Netherlands, Switzerland, France and the Bank for International Settlements
also had significant holdings (Table 5).
The geographical distribution of this short-term debt was somewhat different from the
long term one, with the USA playing a less prominent role and the debt being more evenly
distributed across the other principal creditors. The distribution of short term debt amongst
debtor sectors was also different, with the industrial sector playing a slightly smaller role
and the public sector’s share being higher than that for overall debt (Table 6).
German commercial foreign debt was issued in a variety of currencies, but the US Dollar
was the principal currency of denomination (Table 7). Around 50% of the debt was issued
in US currency, 12% in British Pounds, 11% in Reichsmarks, 10% in Swiss Francs and 9%
in Dutch Guilders.
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Bank for International Settlements 3.49%
Italy 0.69%
(a) by creditor country




Reichsbank and Golddiskontbank 3.67%
Private citizens 2.41%
Insurance companies 0.40%
School, churches etc. 0.11%
(b) by debtor sector
Table 5: Total German foreign commercial debt, November 1931.
Source: Bank of England Archive OV34/69: Die Auslandsverschuldung Deutschlands nach dem Stande von
30. November 1931.









(a) by creditor country




Reichsbank and Golddiskontbank 7.52%
Private citizens 4.58%
Insurance companies 0.47%
School, churches etc. 0.12%
(b) by debtor sector
Table 6: German foreign short-term commercial debt, November 1931.










Table 7: German foreign commercial debt by currency of issue, November 1931.
Source: Bank of England Archive OV34/69: Die Auslandsverschuldung Deutschlands nach dem Stande von
30. November 1931.
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C.2 Controls and repatriations
C.2.1 The exchange control system
Explaining the origin and impact of the German exchange control system was the main
concern of many contemporary authors, and some successive ones as well, writing about
Germany’s foreign economic policy in the 1930s. We summarize this literature here, as
a reference for readers interested in a better understanding of the broader context of the
repatriations.
Writing in the post-war period, Child (1958) saw the exchange control system as a highly
sophisticated trade policy tool, in line with views prevalent in the 1930s expressed, for
example, by Heuser (1934), Einzig (1934) and Katona (1934). Child argued that the German
authorities used the system to manipulate the size, direction and terms of trade in Germany’s
favor, by exploiting the county’s monopolistic/monopsonistic position in certain markets,
especially in South-Eastern Europe and Latin America.
Heuser (1934) and Child (1958) attributed Germany’s reliance on overt and disguised
export subsidies and other manipulations of trade to the inapplicability of policies normally
employed to stimulate exports and reduce imports. The additional export system was,
according to Heuser, one of the few options left to Germany to increase exports and thus
maintain foreign debt service.
Devaluation was ruled out, at least initially, due to the large size of the foreign-currency
denominated debt, which would have increased dramatically in real value. Moreover, for-
feiting the gold anchor might have led to further capital flight, as well as to an increase in
the import prices of essential raw materials and to general inflationary pressures bearing
unpleasant memories of the hyperinflation of less than a decade earlier (Heuser, 1934; Ellis,
1940a). The alternative to devaluation and export subsidies was additional deflationary poli-
cies. Imposing these on an already depressed economy, however, might have caused violent
social unrest and additional capital flight.
However, in a modern reassessment of Nazi Germany’s trade policy, Ritschl (2001) has
ruled out a successful attempt by the German authorities to significantly shape trade flows
before WWII, at least in European markets. Matters changed with military occupation, after
which the exploitation of occupied countries became enormous. This substantially weakens
the trade tool argument for the exchange control system.
Another contemporary, Ellis (1940a), concurred with the trade tool interpretation, but
restricted its validity to a limited time frame, arguing that, after 1933, the perpetuation of
exchange controls ceased to have an economic rationale and was, instead, based on political
objectives of the National Socialist regime. Specifically, he argued that, as the National
Socialist government’s Aktive Konjunkturpolitik (active business cycle policy) gained impor-
tance after 1934, exchange controls were an essential tool for guaranteeing the coexistence of
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies with a fixed exchange rate. In other words, they
became an effective financial repression tool aimed at channeling resources to government
financing. At the same time, they were one of the many facets of the NSDAP’s totalitarian
control of trade, investment and the economy in general.
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C.2.2 The conversion of foreign bonds
As discussed in Section 4.2, repatriated foreign currency bonds could be converted into
domestic Reichsmarks bonds.72 The principal governmental actor involved in this operation
was the Reichsbank subsidiary Golddiskontbank. The Bank physically took custody of the
repatriated foreign bonds from the bondholders and issued new Reichsmarks-denominated
bonds. An example of this can be seen in Figure 11, which features both the original and
reissued bond. This particular bond was Austrian - issued by the Styrian Water Power and
Electricity company - and was converted in December 1939. In fact, after the Anschluss of
1938, Austrian foreign bonds were eligible for conversion by the German Golddiskontbank.
In this case, the bond, originally issued in 1929, for a face value of $50 was converted into
a 132 Reichsmarks bond, implying an exchange rate of 2.64 Reichsmarks per dollar, slightly
above the official 2.5 exchange rate. The coupon of the bond was reduced from the original
6% to 4.5% in line with the mandated interest rate within Germany.
Interestingly, the initiative for converting the bonds could come from both the holders of
the repatriated bonds and the original issuers. The former had several reasons for engaging
in conversions. First, this would ensure the regular and full servicing of the bonds, albeit
with a reduced coupon and in domestic rather than foreign currency. Second, from June
1934, converted bonds could be sold on the stock market, opening the way to immediate and
large arbitrage profits. The final motivation for the conversion of bonds was the increasing
scrutiny under which foreign currency holdings of Germans came as the Nazi government
tightened its grip on the German economy and society. Conversion offered the possibility of
turning foreign currency assets into domestic ones at advantageous conditions.
Bond issuers also had reasons to propose and incentivize the conversion of bonds. The
principal one, already outlined in Section 4.2, is that the blanket foreign default imposed
by the sovereign might not have served the needs and desires of individual bond issuers.
Reputational considerations and the desire to preserve ties with foreign suppliers, clients
and other counterparts spurred some debtors to encourage the repatriation of their bonds by
issuing public offers of conversion. Conversion also facilitated the buyback of the bonds by
the company at a later stage. This was especially relevant if the issuer could not carry out
repatriations on its own because of foreign exchange scarcity. Finally, a larger debt service
in Reichsmarks may have been preferable to a limited one in foreign currency. Once again,
foreign exchange scarcity was the reason, given that currency had competing and potentially
preferable uses compared to debt service, for example the acquisition of production inputs.
Figure 12 provides an example of a conversion offer by the original issuer, in this case
Dortmund municipal utilities. The offer was issued on March 26, 1934 and was binding until
April 15. The bond to be converted was issued in 1928 with a 6.5% coupon and had a 20
year maturity. The exchange rate offered was decisively more generous than the one above,
at 3 Reichsmarks per dollar, against a 2.54 official exchange rate. The coupon was also
slightly higher, 4.75%, as this conversion preceded the March 1935 law-mandated change of
all coupons to 4.5%.
72We thank Josefin Meyer and Hans-Georg Glasemann for useful comments and discussions on this topic.
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(a) Original (b) Converted
Figure 11: An original gold dollar bond and the corresponding converted Reichsmarks bond.
This Austrian gold dollar bond was issued in 1929 and due in 1954. The original $50 face value in the original
issue (left panel) was converted into 132 Reichsmarks (right) by the German Golddiskontbank in 1939. The
coupon was lowered from 6 to 4.5%. Source: Hans-Georg Glasemann, http://www.nonvaleurs.de/
C.2.3 Scrip and blocked accounts operations
Blocked accounts constituted the service of German foreign debts in Reichsmarks - at first
only of short-term Standstill debts, but after 1933 also of long-term debts - which was blocked
from being transferred abroad. In essence, they were arrears of German foreign debt, serviced
in domestic rather than foreign currency. Foreign importers could purchase German goods
using their holdings of these accounts. A discount of between 30 and 60%, depending on
the origin of the blocked account, was applied to the face value of the accounts in these
transactions (Ellis, 1941).
Scrip was also arrears. More precisely, it was German currency with no legal tender,
which was used from June 1933 to pay 50% of the debt service (70% from December of
the same year) on non-Standstill debts. Scrip could be purchased by those wishing to
import German goods in foreign financial centers (often at substantial discount). After
the export transaction, the scrip was converted into Reichsmarks by the Golddiskontbank
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Figure 12: Example of a conversion offer (Umtauschangebot) by the original issuer.
This offer was put out by the Dortmund municipal utilities company to German holders of a 1928 issue
due in 1948 of gold dollar bonds to convert them into Reichsmarks bonds at the Golddiskontbank. Source:
Deutscher Reichsanzeiger und Preußischer Staatsanzeiger, Vierte Beilage, No. 72, March 26, 1934.
at an exchange rate that allowed the central bank to share in the profits of the operation.
As discussed in Section 4.2, scrip and blocked account operations were fairly similar to
each other and involved the transfer of these depreciated Reichsmarks from foreign creditors
to Germans exporters, who could then turn these into regular Reichsmarks for a profit.
Initially, foreign importers would procure these assets to be used in partial payment (up to
60%) of German goods on financial markets. From June 1933, this passage was no longer
necessary, as the repatriation of these assets would take place through the mediation of the
Konversionskasse and the Golddiskontbank. The economic mechanisms underpinning the
operations, however, did not change. As stated by Heuser (1934, page 213): “The fact that
the foreign creditor prefers an immediate realisation of his claim, even at the risk of a loss,
rather than the postponement of it to an uncertain future, is again at the basis of the new
scheme. The main difference between the old and the new method lies in the fact that the
export price reduction is now effected internally, independently of the foreign importer, for
whom it is no longer possible or necessary to acquire depreciated marks in order to obtain
German goods at a lower price.”
Heuser provided a schematic representation of this newer system, which illustrates its
complex working and the various players, both public and private, involved. We reproduce
this scheme in Figure 13 for the reader interested in the details of the repatriations carried
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out in this more unusual and intricate manner. The specific discounts applied to the various
transactions capture the situation in the first half of 1934, after the Law on Payments Abroad
(approved in May 1933) and successive modifications to the level of debt service were passed,
but before the complete moratorium of July 1934 was enforced.
The German debtor would pay the debt service in Reichsmarks to the Konversionskasse.
30% of this service would be transferred by the Konversionskasse to the foreign creditor in
foreign exchange provided by the Reichsbank, provided that this did not exceed 4% of the
principal. The rest of the service would be paid in scrip, which, as mentioned, was German
currency with no legal tender. The creditor could turn the scrip over to a bank in its country
of origin for 67% of its face value, leading to a total 77% debt service. The bank would then
sell the scrip to the Golddiskontbank at 69% of its face value. At the same time, a German
exporter could obtain authorization - after “proving” that its production costs exceed world
prices - to use part of the foreign exchange from its export transactions to purchase scrip
from the Golddiskontbank at 30% discount. The scrip obtained could then be turned into
Reichsmarks at face value at the Konversionskasse leading to a profit that would make up
for the supposed sale below cost. The rest of the foreign exchange, the share depended on
the estimate of the loss incurred by the exporter in the sale abroad, would be transferred to
the Reichsbank.
Transactions with blocked accounts operated within this system as well. The difference
was simply that the owner of blocked accounts could liquidate its outstanding balances at the
Konversionskasse at discounts that depended on the original claim generating the blocked
account. Blocked accounts could represent Registered Marks, Credit Marks, or other forms
of blocked Marks. The owner of the liquidated blocked accounts would receive either scrip
or claim certificates, which would then enter the additional export system.
C.2.4 Colonel Francis Norris and Siegfried Wreszynski
Norris and Wreszynski were a British subject and a citizen of Danzig, respectively. Norris
had been a member of the Inter-allied Commission of Control in Germany, a body set up by
the Treaty of Versailles. The two partners enjoyed some moments of tabloid fame in 1933-35
due to their lavish Park-lane millionaires lifestyle in London and Paris, as well as for the
curiosity surrounding the nature of their fortunes. Sometimes as trustees, other times as debt
factors, they would intermediate the unfreezing of blocked accounts and the repatriation of
German bonds for large holders, such as banks, large companies (e.g. Unilever), and the
Vatican. Accusations of fraud made by some of their clients in England, France, and the
Netherlands are difficult to assess, as they could be part of larger political power plays to
dismantle their operation. In any case, their demise was as quick as their rise. Norris was
indicted in France in May 1934 and expelled from the country in 1935, yet never arrested.
Wreszynski was arrested in Amsterdam in 1938 for small-time frauds, only three years after
a diamond-packed wedding to Norris’ former wife and herself a business partner. After
his release four years later he went into hiding, as he was a Jew in occupied Netherlands.
After the war, he was sentenced for frauds, committed during his hiding, against families of
captured Dutch resistance members.
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Figure 13: The repatriation scheme involving scrip and blocked accounts.
The diagram refers to the period after May 1933, and the various discounts and debt service levels to the
period between December 1933 and July 1934. Source: adapted by the authors from Heuser (1934).
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